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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION, 
The Utah Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0') (1996). This is an appeal from the final Judgment of the 
Utah Second Judicial District Court in and for Davis County, the Honorable Michael G. 
Allphin presiding, over which the Utah Court of Appeals does not have original 
jurisdiction. 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL. 
A. Is Appellant entitled to equitable relief excusing its failure to strictly 
comply with the option exercise notice provisions of the subject Ground Leases based on 
essentially undisputed evidence establishing that the delay in giving notice was slight, 
Appellees were not prejudiced in any way by the delay, and Appellant will suffer a 
significant forfeiture of its valuable leasehold interest in the absence of equitable relief? 
This issue is a mixed question requiring the application of law to essentially 
undisputed facts. Accordingly, the Court will need to determine, under the factors set 
forth in State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994), the degree of deference to be given to 
the trial court's conclusion. See also, e.g., Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1998); 
and Drake v. Industrial Comm'n., 939 P.2d 177 (Utah 1997). 
Appellant preserved this issue for appeal based on its arguments below that it was 
entitled to equitable relief. [R. 4-6, 493-496, 618 p. 5] 
B. Did the trial court err in analyzing Appellant's claimed entitlement to 
equitable relief by imposing a higher standard of care upon Appellant's agents because 
they were "professionals"? 
1 
The determination of the appropriate standard of care is a question of law which is 
reviewed for correctness. Slisze v. Stanley-Bostitch, 979 P.2d 317 (Utaih 1999). 
Appellant preserved this issue for appeal based on its arguments below that its 
agents were not grossly negligent. [R. 4-6, 493-496, 618 p. 5] 
C. Did the trial court err in concluding that Appellant's agents were grossly 
negligent in failing to provide written notice of Appellant's intention to exercise its 
renewal options 150 days prior to the expiration of the Ground Leases? 
This is a mixed question of law and fact for which the standard of review is 
described in subparagraph A. 
Appellant preserved this issue for appeal based on its arguments below that its 
agents were not grossly negligent. [R. 4-6] 
D. Did the trial court err in refusing to hold that constructive knowledge of a 
contractual right is sufficient for purposes of establishing the "knowledge" element of 
implied waiver? 
This is a legal issue which is reviewed for correctness, as set forth in subparagraph 
B. 
Appellant preserved this issue for appeal based on its arguments below that 
Defendants waived their rights to receive notice based on constructive knowledge of such 
right. [R. 5, 505-507] 
E. Did the trial court err in concluding that Appellant had not established by a 
preponderance of the evidence the elements of implied waiver based on essentially 
undisputed evidence? 
2 
This is a mixed question of law and fact which must be reviewed under the 
standard described in Paragraph A. 
Appellant preserved this issue for appeal based on its arguments below. [R. 5, 
505-507] 
III. DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES OR 
OTHER RULES, 
None. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
A. Nature of Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition by Trial Court 
This case involves Appellant's ("U. S. Realty") request for equitable relief and a 
declaratory judgment that U. S. Realty's interest as tenant in certain premises leased from 
Appellees ("Defendants") has not been forfeited as a result of a delay in providing written 
notice of U. S. Realty's intention to exercise certain lease renewal options. This matter 
was tried to the bench, the Honorable Michael G. Allphin presiding, on February 23 and 
24, 2000. By Memorandum Decision dated April 11, 2000, the trial court ruled that U. S. 
Realty was not entitled to equitable relief because its agents were grossly negligent in 
failing to provide written notice of U. S. Realty's intention to exercise the options 150 
days prior to the expiration of the subject Ground Leases. The trial court also held that 
Defendants had not waived their rights to receive written notice. 
B, Statement of Facts. 
1. U. S. Realty is Lessee and Defendants are Lessors under two Ground 
Leases for contiguous parcels of real property located at the intersection of 1-15 and 2600 
3 
South in Woods Cross, Utah. The Ground Leases were executed in 1972 by U.S. 
Realty's predecessor in interest, as tenant, and Defendants, as landlords. U. S. Realty's 
predecessor subsequently constructed a large commercial complex on the previously 
undeveloped real property, which is now identified as the Woods Cross K-Mart Center 
(the "K-Mart Center"). The Ground Lease terms were 25 years with six additional 5-year 
options for extension. [R. 518, Exhs. P-l and P-2] 
2. At or about the time of entering into the Ground Leases, Defendants 
subordinated their interests in the real property to mortgages incurred by U.S. Realty's 
predecessor in interest for the purpose of developing the leased premises and constructing 
the K-Mart Center. [R. 518, Exhs. P-IO-(B) and (C)] 
3. The pertinent terms of the Ground Leases provide that: 
(a) Defendants shall be paid a base annual rent, in advance, 
together with a percentage override from certain rents received from U. S. Realty's 
subtenants of the K-Mart Center. [Exhs. P-l and P-2, ^ 3] Defendants received more 
than $930,298 in ground rents during the initial 25 year terms of the Ground Leases. 
(b) U.S. Realty is responsible for the payment of all taxes, 
assessments, utilities (water, electricity, gas, telephone, sewer, and others) ffl 4(a)], 
insurance ft[ 7(b)], maintenance fl[ 10], and all costs of construction and improvements fl[ 
6]. All such costs have been paid by U.S. Realty and its predecessors in interest. No 
costs were incurred by the Defendants. 
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(c) Upon termination of the Ground Leases, the ownership of all 
improvements on the property, including the buildings thereon, revert to the Defendants. 
[Exhs. land 2,^j 10 and 17] 
(d) In the event of condemnation of any part of the property 
demised under the Ground Leases after construction of buildings and improvements 
thereon, U.S. Really is entitled to a just portion of the damages awarded in the 
condemnation proceeding, as well as a reduction in ground rent in future periods. [Exhs. 
1 and 2, H 15] 
(e) The original terms of both Ground Leases expired on July 31, 
1998. However, the Ground Leases grant U.S. Really a number of options to extend the 
terms of each Lease. Paragraph 22 of both Leases provides, in part, that: 
Tenant shall have the following options to extend the term of 
this Lease, if at the time of extension of the option, the tenant is 
not in default hereunder: 
(i) An option to extend the term for an additional period 
of five years from and after the expiration of the initial lease 
term. 
(ii) If such option is exercised, tenant shall have five 
additional successive options to renew this lease, each for a term 
of five years and each option is conditioned upon the exercise of 
the renewal option immediately preceding. 
(iii) All the options herein granted shall be exercised by 
notice in writing to Landlord given not later than 150 days prior 
to the expiration of the then-existing lease term, and in the 
manner hereinafter provided. A total of six successive five-year 
options were provided. 
5 
4. U.S. Realty acquired its leasehold interest in the K-Mart Center by 
assignment on October 15, 1986 for a total purchase price of $2,045,259. [Exh. P-6]. 
Subsequent to this assignment, U. S. Realty has paid the annual Ground Lease payments 
to Defendants every year, and has also paid certain mortgage payments for debt incurred 
to fund construction of the improvements on the property. As of the date of the 
expiration of the original Lease term, July 31, 1998, U. S. Realty had not yet recouped its 
original investment in the K-Mart Center. [R. 518, 616 pp. 17, 23-28, 31, and R. 617 p. 
235] 
5. After acquiring the K-Mart Center, U. S. Realty employed various 
agents to manage the Center. In October 1995, direct management of U. S. Realty's 
leasehold interest in the K-Mart Center was transferred from Winding Brook Co. to 
Garden Homes Group, with Mr. Mark Hoffman as the principal asset manager. The 
principal of Winding Brook Co., Mr. Jacob Burstyn, was also a general partner in U.S. 
Realty. Immediately prior to Garden Homes Group assuming management of the K-Mart 
Center, Mr. Hoffman and Mr. Phil Shiffman met with Mr. Burstyn and obtained from 
him all the documents in Winding Brook's possession relating to the K-Mart Center, 
including copies of the Ground Leases, Lease Abstracts, tenant leases, maintenance files, 
accounting statements, bank statements, computer data and other records. Hoffman and 
Shiffman obtained five large boxes of documents relating to the K-Mart Center from 
Burstyn at that time. [R. 519, 616 pp. 17, 20 and 21] 
6. The Lease Abstracts obtained from Winding Brook Co. served as a 
working digest or summary of the leases and were utilized in the day-to-day management 
6 
of the K-Mart Center. These Lease Abstracts had been used to manage the Leases since 
U. S. Realty acquired the K-Mart Center in 1986. [R. 519, 616 pp. 22, 67, 112, and Exh. 
P-11(A)-(D)] 
7. At the time Mark Hoffman assumed management responsibilities in 
1995, the K-Mart Center was occupied by K-Mart, Mac Frugal's and Pizza Hut. One 
vacant space was later leased to Heartland Paper Company. [Exhs. P-26, 27, 28, 29] 
8. As the asset manager for U.S. Realty, Mark Hoffman was 
responsible for maintenance of the K-Mart Center, including management of outside 
contractors for the parking lot, roofs and building repairs. He was also responsible to 
make all payables, coordinate with accountants, hire outside local legal counsel when 
needed, handle financing and leasing of space in the Center, make periodic site 
inspections, and supervise personnel who assisted him. Although he is an attorney, Mr. 
Hoffman did not practice law during the time he worked as the asset manager of the K-
Mart Center. [R. 616 pp. 18, 19, 127] 
9. Mr. Phil Shiffman is an accountant who has been employed by 
Garden Homes Group since 1992. Shiffman worked for Hoffman in the day-to-day 
management of U.S. Realty's properties, including the K-Mart Center. Shiffman handled 
the daily administration of U. S. Realty's Leases with its tenants, including collection of 
rents and the payment of taxes, ground rent, and insurance, and other matters requiring 
affirmative acts by U.S. Realty concerning the properties. Mr. Shiffman did not have any 
experience with ground leases prior to the K-Mart Center since U. S. Realty generally 
7 
owns the land and buildings comprising its shopping centers. [R. 616 pp. 29, 158, 159, 
169] 
10. After the documents pertaining to the K-Mart Center were obtained 
by Garden Homes Group from Winding Brook, Shiftman was assigned to review the 
Lease Abstracts and enter the information contained therein into U. S. Realty's computer 
system. In completing this task, Shiffinan relied exclusively on the Abstracts obtained 
from Winding Brook and did not review the Leases. Shiffinan also entered the relevant 
information and Lease deadlines identified in the Abstracts into a daily diary he kept for 
cross-reference purposes and used as a "tickler" system to alert him to significant dates. 
[R. 616 pp. 160, 161, 164] 
11. After Garden Homes Group took over in October 1995, the daily 
system used for management of U.S. Realty's properties, including the K-Mart Center, 
was by reference to the information contained in the Lease Abstracts. Mark Hoffman 
relied upon Phil Shiffinan to provide him with notice of dates requiring action by U. S. 
Realty under the Leases. [R. 616 pp. 22, 45, 46, 114] 
12. The use of Lease Abstracts is an effective and efficient method for 
managing the day-to-day requirements of leased properties. Since the Lease Abstracts 
had been prepared by a partner in U.S. Realty whose management had preceded that of 
Mark Hoffman for several years without any problems, Hoffman felt confident that the 
Abstracts were complete, accurate and reliable. [R. 616 pp. 97, 98, 121] 
13. In 1996, the Utah Department of Transportation notified the 
Defendants and U.S. Realty of UDOT's intention to condemn a part of the subject 
8 
property for construction of an access road to Interstate 15. At that time, Mark Hoffman 
retrieved and reviewed the provisions of the Ground Leases regarding U.S. Realty's 
rights upon condemnation. [Exhs. P-l and P-2 ^ 15] Mark Hoffman concluded that U. S. 
Realty had a right to participate in any severance damages awarded and was entitled to a 
future pro-rata reduction in rent paid to Defendants. [R. 520, 616 pp. 37-40] 
14. Although there were a series of communications with the State of 
Utah regarding settlement of the condemnation during 1996 and 1997, Mark Hoffman 
was not willing to complete an agreement to resolve the condemnation action until 
construction was substantially complete. [R. 616 pp. 54, 55, Exh. P-12 A&B] 
15. Condemnation actions were filed by UDOT in March 1997, naming 
Defendants and U. S. Realty as defendants. Construction was delayed by UDOT from 
1997 until February 1998. [R. 520, 616 pp. 54, 55] 
16. A condemnation settlement proposal was discussed by UDOT, U. S. 
Realty and Defendants which provided for future reductions in the rents to be paid to 
Defendants by U.S. Realty during the option terms of the Ground Leases in exchange for 
a release of U.S. Realty's claims for any part of the damages awarded in the 
condemnation proceeding. [Exh. P-12 A&B] The Defendants were agreeable to and 
orally accepted this resolution. Based on this agreement, U. S. Realty subsequently 
released its interests in the condemnation actions. The trial court expressly found that the 
parties reached an agreement to settle the condemnation actions between April 22, 1998, 
and July 15, 1998. [R. 521, 522, 616 pp. 63, 96, 97, 180, 182, 202, 203, 205, Exhs. P-
12(A) and (B), P-22, P-23] 
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17. On April 17, 1998, after determining that the construction resulting 
from the condemnation was proceeding appropriately, Mark Hoffman reviewed the terms 
of the Ground Leases dealing with the option periods in order to calculate the adjustments 
that needed to be made in the future ground rents as a result of the parties' oral settlement 
of the condemnation action. Mark Hoffman's objective at that time was to reduce the 
parties' oral agreement to writing. Upon reviewing Exhs. P-l and P-2, ^ 22, Mark 
Hoffman first learned that the Ground Leases required U.S. Realty to give 150 days' 
written notice prior to the end of the lease term to exercise its options to renew those 
Leases. [R. 520, 521, 616 pp. 63, 64, 81, 82, Exh. P-17(A) and (B)] 
18. The initial lease terms ended July 31, 1998. The option notice date 
was therefore March 3, 1998. Upon discovery of the notice requirement, Mark Hoffman 
asked Phil Shiffman why he had not given timely notice of the date for exercise of the 
option. Phil Shiffman verified that he did not have the date in his tickler system, nor was 
this information contained in the Lease Abstracts obtained from Winding Brook. [Exh. 
P-l 1] Neither Hoffman nor Shiffman was aware of this omission prior to April 17, 1998. 
Because the date was not in the tickler system, there was nothing to alert Shiffman to 
refer to the Lease Abstracts. [R. 616 pp. 64, 65, 167, Exhs. P-l and P-2] 
19. On April 17, 1998, Mark Hoffman sent certified return receipt letters 
to Defendants, giving notice of U.S. Realty's exercise of its options. These letters were 
received by Defendants on April 22, 1998, but were simply placed in a file. Neither 
defendant knew of or had any concern about option renewal notices until Mr. George 
Fadel, their attorney, requested them to retrieve and review the letters on or about July 
10 
15, 1998. U. S. Realty was in Ml compliance with the Ground Leases at the time these 
notices were provided. [R. 616 pp. 61, 69, 177-179, 204, and 617 pp. 333-334, Exh. P-
13-(A) and (B)] 
20. During the period from March 3, 1998, until July 15, 1998: 
(a) Defendants did not communicate to U.S. Realty that they 
deemed the April 17, 1998, notices to be defective in providing 106 days' notice instead 
of 150 days' notice, or were deficient in any other manner. 
(b) Defendants were in agreement with the settlement of the 
condemnation action under terms whereby U.S. Realty gave up any claims to the 
condemnation award in exchange for ground rent reductions during the option periods. 
(c) Defendants requested Mark Hoffman to contact their 
attorney, Mr. George Fadel, and prepare necessary paperwork to memorialize the 
settlement of the condemnation action. 
(d) Pursuant to Defendants' requests, U.S. Realty paid expenses 
extending into the first option period for sewer assessments and a slope easement, which 
were accepted by Defendants without reservation. [R. 521, 522, 616 pp. 70, 76-82, 91, 
154, and R. 617 p. 335] 
21. On or about July 13, 1998, Mr. Hoffman contacted Mr. Fadel, 
attorney for Defendants, and discussed the agreement settling the condemnation actions. 
Mr. Fadel requested Mr. Hoffman to prepare the paperwork to reflect the agreement for 
future rent reductions in the option periods of the Ground Leases and the release by U.S. 
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Realty of its claims to any of the condemnation proceeds, which Hoffman immediately 
began to draft. [R. 616 pp. 81, 82] 
22. On July 15 and 17, 1998, more than three months after Mr. 
Hoffman's April 17, 1998 notices and only two weeks prior to the expiration of the 
original Lease terms, Defendants sent letters to U.S. Realty for the first time indicating 
that they deemed U.S. Realty's exercise of the option to have been untimely and declared 
the Ground Leases terminated as of July 31, 1998. The Security Investment letter 
demanded more than ten times the amount of the ground rent required under the terms of 
the Lease to be paid in the option period if U. S. Realty wished to continue its occupancy. 
[R. 521, 522, Exhs. P-18 and 19] 
23. The timing of Mark Hoffman's April 17, 1998, renewal notices was 
of no consequence to Defendants since they were unaware of even receiving the notices 
until shortly before the original Lease terms expired. Defendants had taken no action due 
to the delayed notices since they were not even expecting any notice. Defendants did not 
incur any liabilities, obligations or responsibilities regarding the management, operation, 
maintenance, repair, or expenses of the K-Mart Center due to the delay. [R. 521, 616 pp. 
182-186, 195-200, and R. 617 pp. 328-330, 337] 
24. None of the Defendants reviewed or discussed the April 17, 1998 
notices prior to July 15, 1998. The Defendants did not communicate to U.S. Realty that 
U.S. Realty had no standing or claims to compensation in the condemnation action 
because of any failure by U.S. Realty to give 150 day written notice exercising the 
12 
option, nor were any motions filed in the condemnation proceedings to dismiss U.S. 
Realty's claims. [R. 521, 616 pp. 182-186, 195-200, and R. 617 pp. 328-330, 337] 
25. The omission of the date for exercise of the options in the Ground 
Leases is the only error that has occurred in any of the Lease Abstracts for all of the 
properties transferred to Mark Hoffman for management from Winding Brook Co. in 
1995. [R. 520, 521, 616 pp. 99, 166] 
26. Defendants provided no testimony, expert or otherwise, that reliance 
on Lease Abstracts constituted a departure from any standard of care applicable to 
commercial real estate property managers, much less an extreme departure constituting 
gross negligence. 
27. On July 20, 1998, U. S. Realty tendered to Defendants the full 
ground rent for the option period required under the Leases, which was refused. [R. 616 
pp. 88, 89, Exh. 16-(A) and (B)] 
28. As of August 1, 1998, the beginning of the first option period, U. S. 
Realty's leasehold interest in the K-Mart Center, appraised at market value, was worth at 
least $1,300,000. [R. 617 pp. 301, 302, Exh. 30] 
29. If U. S. Realty's tenancy is terminated effective July 31, 1998, U. S. 
Realty will forfeit more than $1,700,000, reduced to present value, in net income 
reasonably expected to be derived from the K-Mart Center during the option periods. [R. 
617 pp. 244, 245, Exh. 25] 
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V. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT, 
In Geisdorf v. Doughty, 972 P.2d 67, 70-71 (Utah 1998), the Utah Supreme Court 
established that strict compliance with lease option renewal provisions may be equitably 
excused under certain instances. This case clearly merits such relief. U. S. Realty's 25-
year Ground Leases, with six five-year options for extension, called for exercise of each 
option by 150 days' written notice to Defendants. Because of an error in U. S. Realty's 
Lease Abstract/tickler system, which had always worked satisfactorily before, U. S. 
Realty provided the requisite notice, but did so 106 days before the expiration of the 
initial term, or 44 days late. Defendants admittedly paid no attention whatsoever to the 
date of receipt of these notices, and operated on the assumption that the Leases had been 
renewed. 
Defendants even requested that U. S. Realty pay sewer charges which would only 
be due if the option had been exercised. Indeed, the trial court found that U. S. Realty and 
Defendants actually entered into an agreement, after the renewal notices were received, 
resolving pending condemnation proceedings by U. S. Realty's agreement to waive any 
right to the condemnation proceeds in exchange for rent reductions during the option 
term. Nevertheless, approximately two weeks before the original term was to have 
expired, Defendants' attorney read the Lease provisions and ascertained that notice had 
been given late, at which point Defendants pounced upon this fact - which had been of 
no practical consequence to them whatsoever - as a basis for declaring the Ground 
Leases terminated, and seeking ,to extract from U. S. Realty more than 10 times the rent 
provided for in the Ground Leases. 
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Surprisingly, the trial court refused to grant equitable relief, determining that 
because U. S. Realty's property managers were "professionals," their reliance upon the 
Lease Abstracts, rather than the actual Leases, constituted gross negligence of such a 
shocking degree as to require the forfeiture of U.S. Realty's leasehold interest, the present 
value of which exceeds $1,300,000. Even more surprisingly, the trial court actually 
rewarded Defendants for their own deliberate indifference to the renewal notices and 
related Lease provisions by holding that the agreement to resolve the condemnation 
proceedings, on terms that could only be carried out if there had been an effective 
renewal, did not constitute waiver because Defendants' deliberate ignorance equated to 
an absence of "actual knowledge" of their rights to receive notice. 
Presumably because the issue of equitable relief was not directly before the Court 
in Geisdorf, the Court did not expand on the required elements of equitable relief in 
option renewal cases. There is no other Utah case addressing this issue, although Courts 
from numerous other jurisdictions, including Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, 
Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, 
Texas, and Washington, have adopted the following standard: 
A lessee may be excused from strict compliance when the 
lessee's conduct in failing to comply was not due to willful 
or gross negligence but was, rather, the result of an honest 
and justifiable mistake. Where the failure to comply is the 
result of mere negligence, equitable relief should be granted 
where the delay in providing written notice has been slight, 
the loss to the lessor is small and to refuse equitable relief 
would result in unconscionable hardship to lessee. 
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The trial court adopted and purported to apply this legal standard to the evidence 
at trial, but erred in concluding that U. S. Realty's agents were grossly negligent, thus 
precluding equitable relief. U. S. Realty contends that the evidence necessary to resolve 
its claim for equitable relief is virtually undisputed. Accordingly, the Court should apply 
minimal deference to the trial court's conclusion that U. S. Realty's agents were grossly 
negligent. The trial court concluded that the distinction between gross negligence and 
ordinary negligence was difficult under these facts, but then imposed a higher standard of 
care upon U. S. Realty's agents because they were "professionals." In this case, an 
enhanced standard should not apply because Mr. Hoffman, an attorney, and Mr. 
Shiftman, an accountant, were acting as property managers for U.S. Realty, not members 
of their professions. As such, Hoffman and Shiffman should be held to the same standard 
as any other property manager, not an enhanced legal standard based solely on their 
professions. 
Under the appropriate legal standards, Hoffman's and Shiffman's reliance on the 
Lease Abstracts that had been prepared by the prior management company to alert them 
to significant dates, such as option renewal dates, was the result of an honest and 
justifiable mistake or, at worst, mere negligence. In fact, their conduct here, a misplaced 
reliance on an inaccurate Lease Abstract, is far less culpable than that uniformly held as 
providing a basis for equitable relief by other courts. The undisputed evidence clearly 
establishes all elements entitling U. S. Realty to equitable relief since the delay in 
providing notice was slight, defendants would not be prejudiced by the Court's granting 
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of equitable relief, and to refuse to grant equitable relief to U. S. Realty would result in an 
unconscionable hardship requiring the forfeiture of an asset worth at least $1,300,000. 
U. S. Realty also contends Defendants' assertions of untimeliness as to the option 
renewal notices are barred by the doctrine of implied waiver. In Geisdorf, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that implied waiver must be analyzed under the totality of the 
circumstances. 972 P.2d at 73, n. 6. In this instance, the trial court refused to find 
implied waiver of Defendants' rights to receive written notice of U. S. Realty's intention 
to exercise its options based substantially on the theory that Defendants had no actual 
knowledge of their right to receive such notice. U. S. Realty contends that constructive 
notice of this right is legally sufficient under these circumstances, and that the right to 
receive the option renewal notice was impliedly waived when all parties agreed to the 
condemnation settlement and Defendants demanded that U. S. Realty pay the sewer bill 
and slope easement payments extending into the option period after the notices from U.S. 
Realty had been received. 
VI. DETAILED ARGUMENT, 
A. The Trial Court Erred in Concluding U. S. Realty's Agents were 
Grossly Negligent, Precluding Equitable Relief, The trial court purported to adopt and 
apply the following legal standard to the evidence produced at trial: equitable relief may 
be granted where the lessee's failure to strictly comply with the option renewal notice 
provision was not due to willful or gross negligence, but was rather the result of an 
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honest or justifiable mistake.1 [Memorandum Decision, p. 8] U. S. Realty contends the 
trial court erred in applying this standard to the present facts for the following reasons: 
(1) the trial court improperly held U. S. Realty's managing agents to a higher standard of 
care for the purposes of the required negligence/mistake analysis because they are 
"professionals"; and (2) the trial court's conclusion that U. S. Realty's agents were 
grossly negligent is not supported by sufficient, competent evidence. As discussed 
below, the numerous cases throughout the country purporting to apply the equitable relief 
standard have never drawn a distinction between "professionals" and "non-
professionals," but have granted equitable relief based on conduct far more culpable than 
that of U.S. Realty. 
1. Applicable legal standard. In Geisdorf, the Utah Supreme Court 
stated: 
Indeed, there are instances in which deviation from 
strict compliance [with the terms of the Lease 
regarding exercise of options] may be equitably 
excused. [Citation omitted] . . . . Some instances in 
which an optionee may be excused from strict 
compliance include when the optionee's conduct in 
failing to comply was not due to willful or gross 
negligence on the part of the optionee, but was rather 
the result of an honest and justifiable mistake . . . . 
Cattle Feeders, Inc. v. Jordan, 549 S.W. 2nd 29 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1977). 
M a t 71. 
1
 Since the trial court held that U. S. Realty was not entitled to equitable relief due to gross negligence, 
the trial court did not analyze or evaluate the requirements of equitable relief based upon a finding of 
simple negligence. 
18 
Although there are no subsequent Utah cases applying the above rule, the Court 
appears to have primarily relied upon Texas law by its citation to Cattle Feeders. The 
development of this standard for equitable relief under similar facts by Texas courts is 
helpful here. For example, Jones v. Gibbs, 130 S.W. 2d 265 (Tex. 1939) is cited in Cattle 
Feeders as the genesis of equitable relief in option exercise cases. The Jones court 
expressly adopts the analysis of the Connecticut Supreme Court in F.B. Fountain v. Stein, 
which is discussed below, as the appropriate standard in Texas. Jones, 130 S.W. 2d at 
272-73. This holding was later confirmed by the Texas Court of Appeals in Inn of Hills, 
Ltd. v. Schulger & Kaiser, 723 S.W. 2d 299, 301 (Tex. App. 1987): 
In cases of mere neglect in fulfilling a condition 
precedent of a lease, which do not fall within accident 
or mistake, equity will relieve when the delay has been 
slight, the loss to the lessor small, and when not to 
grant relief would result in such hardship to the tenant 
as to make it unconscionable to enforce literally the 
condition precedent of the lease. 
Id. (citing Jones). U. S. Realty contends the above cases establish the standard for 
equitable relief under Utah law. 
In analyzing the trial court's decision, the Court must also determine the 
appropriate standard of review. The trial court's conclusion that U. S. Realty's agents 
were grossly negligent and the trial court's refusal to grant equitable relief are mixed 
questions requiring application of the law to the facts. Under these circumstances, the 
Court should apply minimal deference to the trial court's conclusions under State v. Pena, 
869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994), and subsequent cases following this approach. Applying the 
factors set forth in Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1244 (Utah 1998), a minimally 
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deferential standard of review should be employed because: (1) the legal standards for 
gross negligence and equitable relief under these circumstances, while not clearly 
established under prior Utah law, do not necessarily implicate complex and varying fact 
situations; (2) the standards for gross negligence and equitable relief are clearly capable 
of definitive articulation as to relevant legal factors to be applied by the Appellate Court; 
and (3) the trial court did not make any witness credibility findings since all of the 
relevant facts are essentially undisputed. 
Because issues involving standards of care are legal questions, the trial 
court's imposition of a higher standard on U. S. Realty's agents because they are 
"professionals" is a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. Id. 
2. U. S. Realty is entitled to equitable relief under the appropriate 
legal standard. There is an abundance of precedent from other jurisdictions where 
courts have granted equitable relief to tenants faced with nearly identical facts to those 
now before the Court. The seminal case on the issue appears to be F.B. Fountain Co. v. 
Stein, 118 A. 47 (Conn. 1922). In Fountain, a commercial tenant, after investing 
substantial sums improving the leased premises, failed to exercise its option to renew 
within the 30-day notice period. In remanding the matter for a new trial for the 
previously unsuccessful tenant, the Connecticut Supreme Court adopted the following 
rule: 
We think the better rule to be that, in cases of willful or gross 
negligence in failing to fulfill a condition precedent of a lease, 
equity will never relieve. But in cases of mere neglect in 
fulfilling the condition precedent of a lease, which do not fall 
within accident or mistake, equity will relieve when the delay 
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has been slight, the loss to the lessor small, and when not to 
grant relief would result in such hardship to the tenant as to 
make it unconscionable to enforce literally the condition 
precedent of the lease. 
Id. at 50 (emphasis added). 
For more then 75 years the majority of courts around the country have 
consistently applied the equitable principles espoused in Fountain and its progeny to 
relieve tenants from their failure to timely exercise options to renew. In Fleming 
Companies, Inc. v. Equitable Life Ins. Co., 818 P.2d 813 (Kan. App. 1991), a case cited 
in Geisdorf, the corporate tenant under a 30 year lease was required to serve written 
notice of its intention to exercise its renewal option at least one year before the expiration 
of the initial lease term. However, the tenant failed to provide notice in a timely manner 
due to the termination of its assigned employee. Immediately upon discovering this 
delinquency the tenant provided written notice, albeit after the time to do so had expired. 
Id. at 814-15. Following the "majority of jurisdictions in the application of equitable 
principles," the court relieved the tenant from its delinquency. Id. at 817. 
The court expressly found that: (1) the tenant's failure to give notice was 
not the result of intentional, willful or grossly negligent behavior; (2) the tenant stood to 
lose substantial improvements it had made in the property, presumably with the intention 
of exercising the option; and (3) as a result of the tenant's failure to give timely notice, 
the landlord did not change its position in any significant way and was not prejudiced 
thereby. Based on these facts, the court held that: 
To argue [the tenant] should pay more rent because the 
property is now worth more on the open market due to [the 
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tenant's] own efforts [to improve the property] is inequitable . 
. . . [The landlord] made no significant change in reliance on 
the missed deadline; it did not actively seek to lease or sell 
the property to a third party. [The landlord] most likely 
intended all along to simply allow the deadline for renewal to 
pass then renegotiate with [the tenant] for a higher rental rate, 
armed with the club of termination of the lease and forfeiture 
of the very substantial improvements should [the tenant] 
refuse. Also, [the landlord] argues for the sanctity of 
contracts and the need for judicial respect of their bargained-
for terms; yet it clearly wants to avoid the rental rate for the 
renewal period as expressed in the original contract between 
the parties. 
Id. at 820-21. 
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, citing the "modern rule" followed by 
many other jurisdictions, also relieved a commercial tenant from its failure to promptly 
exercise a renewal option under similar facts. In Trollen v. Wabasha, 287 N.W.2d 645 
(Minn. 1979), the lessee failed to timely exercise his option to renew simply because he 
was "unaware of the timing." Id. at 647. The court nonetheless found in favor of the 
lessee because there was no evidence that his conduct was willful or grossly negligent, 
the delay was only two months under a six month prior notice requirement, the landlord 
had taken no action to its detriment as a result of the delay, and the lessee would suffer 
severe economic hardship if the lease was lost due to the economic impacts of having to 
relocate his business. Id. at 648. 
In J.N.A. Realty Corp. v. Cross Bay Chelsea, Inc., 366 N.E.2d 1313 (N.Y. 
Ct. App. 1977), the New York Court of Appeals held that a delinquent tenant was entitled 
to equitable relief even though the tenant was unaware of the deadline because it 
negligently failed to obtain a copy of the appropriate lease documents after receiving an 
assignment of the lease. The tenant had made improvements in the premises at a cost of 
$55,000, and the landlord had previously demanded payment of real property taxes which 
extended into the option period. The court refused to permit termination of the lease as it 
would create "a forfeiture and the gravity of the loss is certainly out of all proportion to 
the gravity of the fault." Id. at 1317-18. 
The Ohio Court of Appeals also relieved a tenant from the consequences of 
its failure to give timely notice to exercise an option where the tenant had simply misread 
its own lease digest. Ward v. Washington Distr., Inc. , 425 N.E.2d 420, 422 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1980). Applying the "majority rule," the court held that ["e]ven when there is an 
absence of an honest mistake by the lessee, where the lessee has made valuable 
improvements to the leased premises, the lessee should not be denied equitable relief 
from his own neglect or inadvertence if a forfeiture of such improvements would result -
provided there is no prejudice to the landlord." Id. at 424 (citations omitted). Since the 
tenant stood to lose the benefit of $72,000 worth of unamortized lease improvements, the 
court held that the tenant was entitled to equitable relief. Id. 
Finally, in Gardner v. HKT Realty Corp., 744 S.W. 2d 735 (Ark. App. 
1988), the Arkansas Court of Appeals recognized that equitable relief is warranted if "it 
is shown that the lessor has not changed his position or otherwise been prejudiced by the 
delay, and . . . the enforcement of the [option notice] covenant will result in undue and 
inequitable hardship to the tenant." Id. at 737 (citations omitted). The court then 
enumerated the factors to be considered in this analysis: (1) the cause and length of the 
tenant's delay in giving notice; (2) the duration of the lease as contemplated by the 
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parties; (3) the financial consequences of enforcement to both parties; and (4) if the 
tenant's valuable leasehold improvements become the property of the landlord upon 
termination of the lease. Id. at 738. The court recognized that this determination turns 
not on a single factor but on the balancing of the equities between the parties, particularly 
the economic consequences to both sides if the option notice term is enforced. Id. at 738. 
The above cases setting forth the majority rule in the United States 
demonstrate that equitable relief is the remedy adopted by most Courts to address the 
current claims. See also, e.g., Car-X Serv. Systems, Inc. v. Kidd-Heller, 927 F. 2d 511, 
515 (10th Cir. 1991) (tenant entitled to equitable relief under Kansas law); Aickin v. 
Ocean View Inv. Co., Inc., 935 P.2d 992, 1001 (Hawaii 1997) (equitable principles apply 
to preserve tenant's leasehold interest even though required six-months' notice was 
provided only two months before the end of a ten-year lease); Sosanie v. Pernetti 
Holding Corp., 279 A.2d 904, 906-8 (N.J. 1971) (tenant entitled to equitable relief where 
substantial harm would result if tenant is forced to relocate, landlord did not change 
position in reliance on delay in providing notice, failure to give notice was based on 
honest mistake as tenant had simply forgotten the date of the deadline, and landlord 
expected the renewal and had made no other plans for the leased space); Inn of the Hills 
v. Schulgen & Kaiser, 723 S.W.2d 299, 300-01 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (equity will relieve 
tenant from its failure to provide timely notice to exercise an option where the delay has 
been slight, the loss to lessor small, and strict enforcement of the provision would result 
in such hardship to the tenant as to make it unconscionable); Fletcher v. Frisbee, 404 
A.2d 1106, 1107-09 (N.H. 1979) (adopting "majority rule" in New Hampshire under 
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similar facts); Holmes Regional Enter., Inc. v. Advanced Med. Diagnostics Corp., 582 
So.2d 822 (Fla. Ct. App. 1991) (affirming equitable relief to tenant even though tenant 
had given tardy notice of its intention to exercise option); and Benetti v. Kishner, 558 
P.2d 537, 538-39) (Nev. 1977) (special circumstances may warrant equitable relief to 
prevent forfeiture if tenant erroneously thought notice to renew was not necessary and no 
circumstances intervened before notice was given to make relief inequitable). 
The evidence here is clear, essentially undisputed, and entirely consistent 
with those factors leading the courts to grant equitable relief to the tenants in the above 
cases. It is clear that U.S. Realty's failure to give timely notice was not deliberate or 
intentional. Rather, it resulted from an honest and justifiable mistake. The failure to give 
timely notice was the result of a singular event of misplaced reliance under circumstances 
where reliance on Lease Abstracts was reasonable and justifiable. The K-Mart Center 
had been managed for years by a partner of U. S. Realty based on the Lease Abstracts 
without incident, and this error was the only one in the Abstracts. 
The delay in giving notice was slight under the circumstances of 25-year 
leases. More importantly, this delay was of absolutely no consequence to anyone. The 
notices were a matter of complete indifference to Defendants, who were not even aware 
of their entitlement to notice. Even though the notices were sent by certified mail, return 
receipt requested, the Defendants paid no attention to the notices when they arrived. 
Indeed, Defendants took no actions whatsoever to their detriment based on this delay. 
Defendants continued up to the very end of the term of the Ground Leases to request and 
receive payments of K-Mart Center expenses by U. S. Realty extending into the first 
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option period of the Ground Leases. Since U.S. Realty had already paid the ground rent 
through July 31, 1998, the Defendants also reached an agreement with U.S. Realty in the 
condemnation actions whereby U. S. Realty would receive reductions of the ground rents 
during future option periods in exchange for U. S. Realty's waiving its claims to part of 
the damages awarded in the condemnation, a sum in excess of $427,000. At the same 
time, Defendants did nothing to prepare to take over management of the K-Mart Center 
in the event U.S. Realty departed on July 31, 1998. 
The evidence is likewise clear that U.S. Realty will suffer a severe 
economic forfeiture if the equitable relief sought is not granted. The uncontroverted 
testimony established the appraised fair market value of U.S. Realty's leasehold interests 
as of August 1, 1998 is $1.3 million. Further, as of August 1, 1998, U.S. Realty had not 
even recouped its original investment in the property and is still carrying a net loss from 
operations since 1986. A positive net profit approximating $1.7 million at present value 
can be reasonably expected to be earned by U. S. Realty from its operation of the K-Mart 
Center during the option periods. The Defendants, on the other hand, without incurring 
any investment or operating risks whatsoever, have received over $930,000 from the 
ground lease payments during the term of the Lease. All of this evidence is undisputed. 
Equity is intended to prevent unconscionable results, which occur when "no 
decent, fair minded person would view the ensuing result without being possessed with a 
profound sense of injustice." Resource Mngmt. Co. v. Weston Ranch, 706 P.2d 1028, 
1041 (Utah 1985). It would indeed be unconscionable for U.S. Realty to lose its 
significant investment in this property just as its risks are beginning to show a profit 
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based on a short delay in giving notice which was of no practical significance 
whatsoever. 
3. The trial court's conclusion that U. S. Realty's agents were 
grossly negligent and the legal standard employed relating thereto are erroneous. 
The trial court did not find that U.S. Realty had failed to meet the criteria 
for equitable relief set forth above. Instead, the trial court, without reference to any of the 
multiple cases which have discussed those criteria, denied all relief and enforced the 
forfeiture of U. S. Realty's interest based upon the determination that the failure on the 
part of U.S. Realty to give notice was the result, not of an honest mistake or of mere 
neglect, but of gross negligence. The court's stated theory was that because Mark 
Hoffman and Phil Shiffman are "professionals," they should have read the Lease 
Agreement rather than relying upon Lease Abstracts or a tickler system. The trial court 
purported to apply a "sliding scale" approach whereby negligence became "gross" at 
some completely indeterminate point. As a review of the case law makes clear, such a 
sliding scale approach with an enhanced legal standard in this context is wholly 
inappropriate. 
Gross negligence has been defined as "the want of even slight or scant care 
- the failure to exercise that care which even a careless person would use - an utter lack of 
care." W. Prosser, The Law of Torts, § 34 at 187 (3rd Ed. 1964). See also Atkin Wright 
& Miles v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 709 P.2d 330, 335 (Utah 1985). "Willful" 
negligence is an aggravated form of misconduct, differing in quality from an ordinary 
lack of care in that the actor must be aware that his conduct will probably result in injury. 
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See Golding v. Ashley Cent. Irr. Co., 793 P.2d 897, 900 (Utah 1990). On the other hand, 
mistake is defined as: 
An unintentional act, omission or error arising from 
ignorance, surprise, imposition or misplaced 
confidence. 
Black's Law Dictionary 903 (5th Ed. 1979). 
The first legal error in the trial court's analysis of the above distinctions 
was its holding that U. S. Realty's agents, Hoffman and Shiftman, had to comply with a 
higher standard of care simply because they are "professionals." Although individuals 
engaged in rendering services in a trade or profession, such as lawyers and accountants, 
are generally required to exercise the skill and knowledge of those normally possessed by 
members of that profession, Hoffman (an attorney) and Shiffman (an accountant) were 
not acting as professionals on behalf of U. S. Realty. Rather, it is undisputed that 
Hoffman and Shiffman were acting as property managers. Hoffman specifically testified 
that he was not practicing law while employed with Garden Homes Group. Accordingly, 
the Court erred in requiring a higher standard of care and conduct by them. An expanded 
standard of care for professionals applies only when they have undertaken to render 
services in their profession. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 299(a), cmt (b) (1977). 
Applying an inappropriate and more stringent legal standard of care is of 
great significance in this case. As the trial court acknowledged, the facts of this case 
made it difficult for the court to simply conclude that U. S. Realty was willfully or 
grossly negligent, or that U. S. Realty's agents were merely negligent. [Memorandum 
Decision, p. 8] The higher standard of care was employed by the trial court to tip the 
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scales against U. S. Realty and improperly conclude U. S. Realty's agents were grossly 
negligent, a conclusion that is not supported by the evidence under an appropriate legal 
standard. 
The Court's application of its gross negligence standard is also erroneous. 
In deciding whether equitable relief is to be granted, courts focus, first and foremost, on 
whether the criteria for such relief have been met. If these tests are satisfied, courts spend 
little time in attempting to draw fine distinctions between "negligence" and "gross 
negligence," no doubt recognizing that ultimately the test should be whether in the 
absence of equitable relief "the gravity of the loss" will be "out of all proportion to the 
gravity of the fault." J.N.A. Realty Corp. v. Cross Bay Chelsea, Inc., supra, 366 N.E.2d 
at 1317-18. Accordingly, it is only where the tenant's conduct is truly culpable, and not 
just negligent, that courts will consider denying equitable relief where all of the other 
criteria are met. 
Indeed, if the trial court's "sliding scale" approach were to be utilized, the 
denial of equitable relief would be far more the rule than the exception, since it could 
virtually always be said that a tenant whose very livelihood is dependent upon the timely 
exercise of a renewal option should be held to a "high" standard in terms of making 
certain that the option is properly exercised, and has been "grossly negligent" in failing to 
give such an important matter the proper attention. In light of the fact, however, that one 
of the criteria for granting relief is the extent of the forfeiture - that is, the extent of the 
significance of the leasehold interest to the tenant - the entire analysis would be on a 
collision course with itself, since the very criteria for granting relief would also furnish 
29 
the basis for denying that relief by elevating the "negligence" to "gross negligence" 
virtually as a matter of course, in light of the important of the interest involved. 
The error in the trial court's approach is clear from the facts of the cases, 
previously discussed above, in which equitable relief was granted. As will readily be 
seen, the degree of negligence in these cases is certainly not less than the mistake or 
negligence that was present here, and in most cases, was considerably more culpable. 
Indeed, a review of the facts of those cases (arranged alphabetically by jurisdiction) 
makes the erroneous nature of the trial court's reasoning obvious. 
Initially, in Gardner v. HKT Realty Corp., supra, the tenant was engaged in 
negotiations with respect to certain disputes with the landlord. Although the tenant was 
aware of the deadline for exercising the option to renew, it intentionally refrained from 
doing so in the belief that exercising the renewal would prejudice its position. Although 
the tenant in this case had not acted negligently at all, but, in fact, intentionally, the 
Arkansas court nevertheless granted equitable relief, pointing out that those cases 
throughout the country granting such relief turned "not on a single factor but on the 
balancing of the equities between the parties, i.e., the extent to which the lessor has 
changed his position or otherwise been damaged, and the extent to which enforcement of 
the covenant would be an unconscionable hardship on the tenant." 744 S.W.2d at 738. 
In F.B. Fountain Co. v. Stein, supra, as best as can be determined, the 
tenant merely "forgot" to exercise the option to renew. Characterizing the failure as 
"mere forgetfulness which at most is negligence," the Connecticut court stated "that 
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nothing short of willful, that is, voluntary, gross or inexcusable neglect, would prevent 
equitable relief under the circumstances of this case." 118 A. at 49. 
In Aickin v. Ocean View Inv. Co., Inc., supra, the only reason given for the 
lessees' failure to give timely notice was that it was an "oversight," and a "mistake and 
not intentional." 935 P.2d at 1000. The Hawaii court stated that such actions were not 
"intentional, willful, or even grossly negligence." Id. 
In Car-X Service Systems, Inc. v. Kidd-Heller, supra, the Tenth Circuit was 
not concerned with the reason as to why the notice had not timely been given at all. 
Rather, predicting (correctly) that Kansas courts would grant equitable relief pursuant to 
the standards set down in F.B. Fountain Co. v. Stein, and its progeny, that court 
concluded that it was sufficient that this was "not an instance of an intentioned or willful 
failure to timely renew." Id. 927 F.2d at 516. And, indeed, when confronted with the 
precise issue in Fleming Companies, Inc. v. Equitable Life Ins. Co. of Iowa, supra, the 
Kansas Court of Appeals agreed, granting equitable relief notwithstanding the fact that 
the tenant was a sophisticated corporation, with a highly structured system for monitoring 
its leases, which had suffered an internal miscommunication when the employee who had 
been in charge of the matter left, after meeting with his immediate supervisor, and 
providing him with a folder containing leases (including the subject one) that required 
"immediate attention." 818 P. 2d at 814-15. Again, that court found that there was "no 
evidence in the record to suggest that Fleming's actions were intentional, willful, or even 
inexcusably negligence," and stated that the characterization of its conduct "as negligence 
or mistaken is basically irrelevant," and that "as long as its conduct was not intentional, 
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willful, or grossly negligent," it should prevail. The court further said, in words equally 
applicable here, that "Equitable [the Landlord] might attempt to argue that a failure to 
renew a lease of such value to the company would amount to gross negligence, but this is 
not supported by the facts of record." 818 P.2d at 820. 
In Trollen v. City of Wabasha, supra, the tenant apparently simply never 
bothered to check his lease, and was, therefore, "unaware of the timing" with respect to 
the exercise of the option to renew. 287 N.W.2d at 647. Finding that there was no 
evidence the tenant "was willfully or grossly negligent," and that his "reasonable reliance 
on the past course of dealings between himself and the city led him to neglect 
ascertaining his formal obligations under the lease," the Minnesota court held that 
equitable relief should have been granted. Id. at 648. 
In Fletcher v. Frisbee, supra, the tenant utilized an attorney to exercise the 
option, but the attorney apparently failed to discover the deadline for exercise of the 
option in the lease, and, therefore, sent notice late. 404 A.2d at 1108. The New 
Hampshire court not only excused this negligence, but excused the failure to send the 
notice by registered mail, notwithstanding a specific lease requirement. Id. at 1109. 
In Sosanie v. Pernetti Holding Corp., supra, the only basis given for the 
tenants' failure to give timely notice was "that they had forgotten the date of the 
deadline." 279 A.2d at 908. The New Jersey court granted equitable relief, stating that it 
was "clear that defendant did not change its position in reliance on plaintiffs' delay," and 
plaintiffs were not, therefore, "in laches." Id. 
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In J.N.A. Realty Corp. v. Cross Bay Chelsea, Inc., supra, there had been a 
lease assignment, and a closing at which a Modification Agreement making specific 
reference to the lease paragraph containing the provisions for renewal had been executed. 
366 N.E.2d at 1315. Although it is difficult to imagine anything that would have more 
clearly brought to the attention of the assignees the existence of the renewal provision, 
the assignees apparently never bothered to obtain a copy of the lease or of the specific 
paragraph referred to, and had simply assumed that they had an absolute right to retain 
the tenancy. Id. The New York court noted that it had "cautioned that equitable relief 
would be denied where there has been a willful or gross neglect . . . but, has been 
reluctant to employ the sanction when a forfeiture would result." 366 N.E.2d at 1317. 
Here, the "tenant was at fault, but not in a culpable sense," and equitable relief should 
have been granted. Id. 
Similarly, in Ward v. Washington Distributors, Inc., supra, the tenant, like 
U.S. Realty here, utilized a lease abstract system, and failed to timely renew due to an 
inaccuracy in that system. 429 N.E.2d at 422. The Ohio court characterized the delay in 
renewing the lease as having been "caused by an honest, good-faith mistake, to wit, the 
misreading of the lease" and the misfiling of the landlord's prior letter alerting the tenant 
to the correct commencement date, and found equitable relief appropriate, since "there 
was no willful or deliberate act or omission of the lessees." Id. at 423. 
Finally, in Inn of the Hills, Ltd. v. Schulgen & Kaiser, supra, there was an 
assignment of the applicable lease to a partnership. Although one of the partners was a 
licensed real estate broker, and although the partnership was represented by an attorney in 
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connection with the assignment, neither the partners, nor the attorney, bothered to obtain 
a copy of the lease or read the lease prior to the assignment. 723 S.W.2d at 300. The 
tenant only became aware of any renewal requirement at all when the landlord advised 
that it had not been timely exercised. Id. Interestingly, the landlord made an argument 
strikingly similar to the argument that was accepted by the trial court in this case, 
pointing to the tenant's failure even to obtain a copy of the lease, and, in particular, 
arguing "Schulgen, as a real estate agent, knew or should have known to inquire and 
obtain copies of the relevant instruments." Id. at 301. The Texas court stated that 
although the plaintiff was negligent, to "overlook something does not call for punitive 
treatment," and that since plaintiffs "conduct does not reflect conscious indifference of 
his right, nor can we say that it represents the attitude of a person who knew of his peril 
but demonstrated by his conduct that he did not care," equitable relief was appropriate. 
Id. 
There is simply no way that the conduct of U.S. Realty could be deemed so 
radically different in degree or kind from the conduct of the tenants in the above cases as 
to warrant the punitive result here. U.S. Realty set up a system for the management of its 
properties and for its Leases, and had always found that system to be accurate. In this 
one case, unfortunately, the system failed, and as a result, the notice was sent late. There 
was no intentional failure to renew, as in Gardner; no casual indifference such as 
apparently existed in F.B. Fountain Co., Aickin, Car-X Service, Trollen or Sosanie, and 
certainly no failure to even bother to obtain a copy of the relevant Lease or Lease 
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provisions, as in J.N.A. Realty or Inn of the Hills. The extreme result here cannot, then, 
be justified under any of the relevant case law. 
The use of the "sliding scale" approach with a heightened standard of care 
by the trial court so as to deny U.S. Realty the relief to which it plainly would have been 
entitled in virtually every jurisdiction recognizing the availability of such relief was clear 
error. The determination of the trial court should, therefore, be reversed. 
4. Marshalling of the evidence. Being mindful of the requirement of 
Rule 24(a)(9), Utah R. App. P., that a party challenging a finding of fact2 must first 
marshal the evidence, U. S. realty recites the following: 
(a) Mark Hoffman is a lawyer who, prior to his employment by 
Garden Homes, was employed by a private law firm for three years. Mr. Hoffman 
graduated from Seton Hall Law School in 1990. While in private practice, Mr. Hoffman 
engaged in a general real estate practice, which included drafting contracts for the sale of 
real estate. Mr. Hoffman had no previous legal experience with leases. [R. 616 pp. 16, 
103, 104] 
(b) At the time Mr. Hoffman became the asset manager of the K-
Mart Center and the other centers that were acquired by U. S. Realty in 1995, he did not 
read the Ground Leases in their entirety. Instead, he relied upon Phil Shiftman to advise 
him as to any deadlines requiring action on the part of U. S. Realty. [R. 616 p. 45] 
* As stated above, U. S. Realty contends that its challenges to the trial court's ruling involves mixed 
questions of law and fact or conclusions of law. However, the evidence is marshaled in the event the 
findings of fact are implicated in this appeal. 
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(c) In November 1996, Mr. Hoffman received a letter from Mr. 
Joel Nelson of UDOT referencing the expiration of the Ground Leases in July, 1998. Mr. 
Hoffman was not concerned at this time about the option renewal requirements because 
his previous experience indicated that U. S. Realty's system of relying upon lease 
abstracts was working well and that he would be advised by Phil Shiffman as to any 
approaching deadlines for taking action. [R. 616 pp. 51, 122, 123, Exhs. 12(A) and (B)] 
(d) Mr. Hoffman read the option renewal provisions of the 
Ground Leases for the first time on April 17, 1998. Prior to this date, Mr. Hoffman was 
unaware that written notice of U. S. Realty's intention to exercise its option was required. 
The option notice requirements were not contained in the Lease Abstracts received from 
Winding Brook and entered into U. S. Realty's computer database by Phil Shiffman. [R. 
616 pp. 51, 122, 123] 
(e) Phil Shiffman did not separately and specifically read or 
abstract the Ground Leases at the time these documents were obtained from Winding 
Brook because he relied entirely on the Lease Abstracts to provide all relevant 
information about those Leases. [R. 616 p. 169] 
(f) Mr. Hoffman had access to the Ground Leases and had 
consulted them for other purposes, but he did not specifically undertake to determine the 
length of the original terms or any option provisions until April 17, 1998. [R. 616 p. 113] 
(g) Mr. Hoffman did not deem it necessary to specifically 
compare the Abstracts with the Ground Leases because he had confidence in the prior 
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management company and the abstracts they had prepared, since Mr. Burstyn was a 
partner in U. S. Realty. [R. 616 pp. 120, 121] 
(h) The Defendants did not take any action which caused U. S. 
Realty to delay giving the notice of intention to exercise its options. [R. 616 p. 144] 
(i) Phil Shiftman did not specifically prepare a separate lease 
abstract for the Ground Leases because his experience was limited to tracking the 
obligations of landlords under leases, not tenants, and Mr. Shiftman had never previously 
managed a tenant's responsibility under a Ground Lease. [R. 616 pp. 111-112, 169] 
(j) The Lease Abstracts do not advise as to how or when the 
Ground Lease options are to be exercised. [Exhs. 11(A)-(D)] 
(k) U. S. Realty's tenants at the K-Mart Center were required to 
give written notice of their intention to renew options under the Leases. [R. 616 pp. 110, 
111, 173, 174, Exhs. 26-29] 
B. The Trial Court Erred in Concluding that Defendants had not 
Impliedly Waived their Right to Receive Notice, Even if this Court were to find that 
U.S. Realty is not entitled to equitable relief, the Defendants have clearly waived any 
right to insist on strict enforcement of the option renewal notice provisions. A landlord's 
contractual right to receive notice of a tenant's intent to renew a Lease may be waived if 
the landlord has knowledge of its right to notice and has expressed or implied an 
intention to relinquish the right. See, e.g., Geisdorf v. Doughty, 972 P.2d 67, 71-72 (Utah 
1998). The required intent to relinquish a contractual right may be implied from action or 
inaction by the waiving party. See K & T, Inc. v. Koroulis, 888 P.2d 623, 629 (Utah 
37 
1994). Although the intent to relinquish the right must be distinct, the trial court must 
examine the totality of the circumstances to determine if the inference of relinquishment 
is justified. See, e.g, Geisdorf, 972 P.2d at 73, n. 6, and Soter's v. Deseret Federal Sav. 
and Loan, 857 P.2d 935, 941-42 (Utah 1993). "There may be instances in which a 
number of ambiguous events, statements or examples of conduct may show, in the 
totality of circumstances, a distinct intent." Geisdorf, 972 P.2d at n.6. 
To evaluate waiver implied from conduct, the Court's primary focus must be the 
effect of such conduct on the party claiming waiver, not any unspoken or private mental 
reservation by the waiving party. See, e.g., B.R. Woodward Mrktg. v. Collins Food, 754 
P.2d 99, 103 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Such conduct must clearly evince an intent to waive 
or at least be inconsistent with any other intent. Id "Failure to adhere to the precise 
terms of the contract, combined with the absence of notice of a party's intention to insist 
on strict compliance, is enough evidence to support a finding of waiver." Beckstead v. 
Deseret Roofing Co., Inc., 831 P.2d 130, 133 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Beckstead is particularly helpful in examining how the Utah appellate courts have 
applied the doctrine of implied waiver with respect to contractual notice provisions. In 
Beckstead, the plaintiff entered into a contract with the defendant roofing company for 
the repair of plaintiff s roof. The contract required that plaintiff provide written notice to 
the roofing company within 30 days of the discovery of any leaks. Plaintiff admittedly 
failed to comply with this notice requirement, and the roofing company subsequently 
asserted that the plaintiffs failure precluded any claim for additional repairs. 831 P. 2d at 
132-133. The plaintiff had given oral notice to which the roofing company had 
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previously responded. Under these facts, the trial court found that the roofing company 
had waived its right to receive written notice. This finding was affirmed by the Utah 
Court of Appeals, citing the "totality of the circumstances." Id. 
In this case, U. S. Realty argued that implied waiver was established under the 
totality of the circumstances. The following facts, which are essentially undisputed, 
establish the primary support for this claim: (1) both before and after the deadline for 
giving the required notice, the Defendants continued to negotiate, and eventually reached 
an agreement, with U. S. Realty for reduction in ground rents during the option periods in 
exchange for U. S. Realty's waiver of any rights to the proceeds of the condemnation 
actions; and (2) Defendant, Security Investment, requested that U. S. Realty pay sewer 
assessments up through December 31, 1998, which is five months into the option period. 
U. S. Realty also made a slope easement payment to Defendants extending into the option 
period. 
The trial court concluded that the above factors, taken together, did not constitute 
a clear did unambiguous waiver by implication. The court primarily based this decision 
on the its finding that Defendants were unaware of their rights to timely notice until on or 
about July 15, 1998. [Memorandum Decision, p. 13] U. S. Realty contends the court 
erred as a matter of law in its application of the implied waiver analysis. 
1. Constructive knowledge of a contractual right is sufficient for 
purposes of implied waiver. Although no Utah case appears to deal specifically with 
the issue, U. S. Realty contends that constructive knowledge is sufficient, under the 
totality of the circumstances, to support the "knowledge" element of implied waiver. It 
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makes no sense to encourage parties to remain ignorant of contractual rights and 
obligations by rigidly applying an "actual" knowledge standard for purposes of implied 
waiver. 
Substantial authority exists from other jurisdictions to establish this 
principle. In R. Conrad Moore and Assoc, Inc., v. Lerma, 946 S.W. 2d 90 (Tex. App. 
1997), the Texas Court of Appeals addressed a claim by a seller of real property that the 
prospective buyers had impliedly waived their contractual right to the refund of their 
earnest money by the buyers' conduct subsequent to the events creating the right to the 
refund. The real estate contract at issue provided that if the buyers' loan was not 
approved within 60 days, the contract would terminate and the earnest: money would be 
refunded to the buyer without delay. 946 S.W. 2d at 92. However, after the loan was not 
approved within 60 days, the buyers continued their efforts to purchase the home, 
including the approval of construction plans and requests for additions and alterations to 
the home. Id. at 93, 94. 
The buyers subsequently demanded a refund of their earnest money, which 
was rejected by the seller. At trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the buyers, 
finding that the seller had breached the contract by failing to promptly return the earnest 
money. IdL 
The Texas Court of Appeals reversed the jury verdict, finding as a matter of 
law that the buyers impliedly waived their right to have the earnest money refunded by 
their conduct. The Court rejected the buyers' arguments that they were unaware of the 
refund right on the date the right arose and therefore could not relinquish a "known" 
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right. Id. After citing the rule that constructive knowledge of a contractual right is 
sufficient, the Court held that "[Although the [buyers] claim that they were unaware that 
they could get their money back on [the date the right arose], both [buyers] signed the 
contract . . . A person who signs a contract is presumed to know and understand its 
contents; absent a finding of fraud, failure to comprehend the rights and obligations under 
the contract will not excuse performance." Id. at 94. See also Garff Realty Co. v. Better 
Buildings, Inc., 120 Utah 344, 234, P.2d 842, 844 (Utah 1951) (party chargeable with 
knowledge of contractual terms); 28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estoppel and Waiver § 158 (waiver 
requires actual or constructive knowledge of right). 
Many other jurisdictions and respected treatises also recognize that 
constructive knowledge of a right is sufficient for purposes of implied waiver: 
The party who has allegedly waived his or her contract rights is 
presumed to know those things (including matters concerning 
the other party's performance or failure to perform) which 
reasonable diligence on his or her part would bring to his or her 
attention. Thus, the party charged with waiver may not plead 
willful ignorance and escape the waiver; rather, a waiver made 
with knowledge of the facts that would put an ordinary person 
on inquiry is sufficient. Consistent with this rule, because a 
person who signs a contract is presumed to know and understand 
its contents, the failure to read a contract, or to apprehend the 
rights and obligations under it, will not prevent a waiver of its 
terms and conditions. 
Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts, Vol. 13., p. 595-96 (4th ed., 2000), See 
also, e.g., Ridgway v. Shelter Ins. Co., 913 P.2d 1231, 1235 (Kan. App. 1996) 
(knowledge of a contractual right for purposes of implied waiver may be actual or 
constructive, and it is the duty of every contracting party to learn and know the contents 
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of its contract); In re Sangren, 504 N.W. 2d 786, 790 (Minn. App. 1993) (for purposes of 
waiver, the knowledge of the contractual right alleged to have been waived may be actual 
or constructive); Pipe Indust. Ins. v. Consolidated Pipe Trades Trust of Montana, 760 
P.2d 711, 717 (Mont. 1998) (approving a jury instruction on waiver which included the 
following language: "A person may waive a right, claim or privilege only if he has 
knowledge of the facts which are material or important to his decision. This knowledge 
may be either actual or constructive. Constructive knowledge is knowledge which one 
has an opportunity to acquire by the exercise of ordinary care and diligence, whether or 
not such knowledge is, in fact, acquired."); and Taylor v. Kenco Chemical and Mfg. 
Corp., 465 So.2d 581, 587 (Fla. App. 1985) (the knowledge requirement for purposes of 
waiver may be actual or constructive). 
In light of the above, the trial court committed clear legal error in requiring 
actual knowledge of Defendants' contractual rights to receive notice as a necessary 
element of implied waiver. Such right was established in the Leases, and Defendants are 
charged with constructive knowledge of those terms. 
2. The trial court erred in its application of the implied waiver 
standard to essentially undisputed facts. Applying the appropriate standard to the 
evidence produced at trial compels the conclusion that Defendants' conduct, through 
action and inaction, constitutes implied waiver of the right to receive 150 day prior 
written notice of U. S. Realty's intent to exercise its options. Similar to the roofing 
contractor in Beckstead, discussed above, Defendants did not insist upon strict 
compliance with the written notice provision until July 15, 1998, only two weeks prior to 
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the expiration of the original term and three months after U. S. Realty's written notice 
exercising the option was provided. In the interim, all parties continued to negotiate 
resolution of the condemnation actions, the terms of which would provide economic 
benefits to U. S. Realty only during the future option periods. If the leases were to 
terminate on July 31, 1998, for failure of timely notice to renew, there would have been 
no need to negotiate this resolution after the option renewal date passed on March 3, 
1998. Yet, it is undisputed - and the trial court found — that these negotiations continued 
until an agreement was reached providing Defendants with the entire condemnation 
proceeds, and U.S. Realty a reduction in rent during the option periods. Defendants even 
requested Mark Hoffman to prepare a written agreement memorializing this agreement 
only a few days before Defendants purported to terminate the Leases. All of these 
actions are inconsistent with anything other than an intent to waive the notice provision. 
Finally, on July 8, 1998, Defendants sent Mark Hoffman a letter demanding 
payment of option period sewer expenses. These actions are also inconsistent with any 
intent other than the waiver of the notice provision. If the Leases were terminating, U. S. 
Realty would have no obligation to make these payments. Incredibly, Defendants were 
instead allowed by the trial court to use their willful ignorance of the Ground Lease terms 
as the basis to preclude waiver while depriving U.S. Realty of its rights on the same 
asserted basis. This result cannot be appropriate. 
Tellingly, the notices sent by U. S. Realty were actually ignored by both 
Defendants, indicating that they attached no significance whatsoever to the right to 
receive notice or when it is received. Accordingly, the totality of these circumstances 
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clearly evinces an intent to waive the notice requirement or is at least inconsistent with 
any other intent, and the elements of implied waiver are established. The trial court's 
ruling to the contrary must be rejected. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The trial court clearly erred in concluding that U. S. Realty was not entitled to 
equitable relief excusing its failure to deliver timely notice of its intention to exercise its 
options to renew the Ground Leases. The Court not only made legal errors in applying an 
improper legal standard, the Court also erred in concluding that U. S. Realty's agents 
were grossly negligent in failing to provide timely notice based on the undisputed facts of 
this case. Under the appropriate legal standard, the evidence demonstrates that the failure 
to provide a timely notice was not due to any willful misconduct or utter lack of care by 
U. S. Realty's agents but, rather, was the result of an honest and justifiable mistake or, at 
worst, mere negligence. The delay in giving notice under these long-term Leases was 
very slight, there is no resulting prejudice to the Defendants, and to deny U. S. Realty the 
equitable relief it seeks would result in the forfeiture of its leasehold interest worth more 
than $1,300,000. 
The trial court also erred in concluding that the Defendants had not impliedly 
waived their right to receive notice of U. S. Realty's intention to exercise its options. The 
trial court applied an erroneous legal standard in failing to recognize tibiat implied waiver 
can be based upon constructive knowledge of a contractual right. The undisputed 
evidence, as well as the findings of the Court, demonstrate that Defendants' conduct after 
they received the untimely notices strongly evinces an intention to waive the right to 
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receive notice and is inconsistent with any other intent. Specifically, the parties 
continued to negotiate and reached an agreement resolving the pending condemnation 
actions, which could be implemented only if U. S. Realty exercised its options since the 
agreement only provided U. S. Realty with a reduction in future rents. 
As a result of the foregoing, U. S. Realty respectfully requests this Court to 
reverse the trial court's Judgment and enter an Order granting U. S. Realty the equitable 
relief it seeks in the form of a declaratory judgment excusing its failure to provide timely 
notice, and declaring that Defendants have impliedly waived any right to receive such 
notice. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this c ? ^ ^ v day of September, 2000. 
YOUNG, ADAMS & HOFFMAN, LLP 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the /flJ day of September, 2000, 
true and correct copies of the foregoing instrument were placed in the United States mail, 
with first-class postage prepaid thereon, addressed to the following coimsel of record, to-
wit: 
George K. Fadel, Esq. 
Attorney for Appellees/Defendants 
170 West 400 South 
Bountiful, UT 84010 
\ ' 0 
46 
ADDENDUM EXHIBITS 
P-l Ground Lease (Olson) dated August 17, 1972 
P-2 Ground Lease (Security Investment) dated August 17, 1972 
P-l 1 Abstracts of Leases 
P-l3 Notices of Exercise of Ground Lease Option dated April 17, 1998 
P-l5 Security Investment Letter to Pay Sewer Service dated July 8, 1998 
P-l8 Olson Letter Terminating Lease dated July 15, 1998 
P-l9 Security Investment Letter Returning Check dated July 21, 1998 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, FARMTNGTON DEPARTMENT 
U.S. REALTY 86 ASSOCIATES, 
a New Jersey general partnership, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
SECURITY INVESTMENT LTD., a Utah 
limited partnership, WILLIAM K. OLSON, 




Case No. 980700324 
This matter was tried to the Court on February 23 & 24, 2000. Following the trial the 
Court asked the parties to submit post-trial briefs on three legal issues, which the Court will 
discuss below. The parties submitted their post-trial briefs, and oral argument was had before the 
Court on March 28, 2000. The matter is now ripe for decision. The Court has considered the 
facts, the arguments of the parties and the applicable law. Being fully informed, the Court makes 
the following findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Court finds that the following undisputed material facts support its conclusions of 
law: 
1. The defendants are the owners of the property that is the subject of the leases at issue in this 
case.1 
2. The defendants entered into leases in 1972 with plaintiffs predecessors in interest. Pursuant 
to those leases defendants leased the undeveloped real property to plaintiffs predecessors in 
interest. The leases were for a term of 25 years with additional five year options for extension of 
the leases. The 25 year term was to begin on August 1, 1973. 
3. After the lease term began, plaintiffs predecessors in interest mortgaged the property in 
order to build the Woods Cross K-Mart Center (the "K-Mart Center"). Defendants subordinated 
their interests in the real property to the mortgages to facilitate the development of the property. 
Plaintiff and its predecessors in interest have paid the mortgage payments since that time. 
However, the parties agree that if plaintiff is unable to exercise the option at issue here, 
defendants will take over the mortgage payments from the time the lease terminated until they are 
paid in full. 
4. Plaintiff obtained the leasehold estates from its predecessors in interest on October 15, 1986. 
Plaintiff paid rent to the defendants from that date until the end of the 25 year lease term, on July 
31, 1998. 
1
 Part of the land in question is owned by Security Investment, LTD., and part of the land is 
owned by defendants Olson. One of the leases is between plaintiff and Security Investment, 
LTD., and the other is between plaintiff and defendants Olson. For the purposes of the Court's 
analysis, the terms of the leases are identical in all respects. 
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5. Under the lease agreements between plaintiff and defendants, there was an initial option to 
extend the lease term for five years after the expiration of the initial lease term. If that initial 
option was exercised, plaintiff was entitled to five successive options to extend the lease term, 
each for a term of five years. The options were to be exercised by plaintiff as follows: "All 
options herein granted shall be exercised by notice in writing to Landlord given not later than 150 
days prior to the expiration of the then-existing lease term . . . ." Thus, plaintiff should have given 
written notice to defendants of their intent to exercise the option no later than March 3, 1998. 
6. In October of 1995, direct management of the K-Mart Center was transferred from Winding 
Brook Co. to Garden Homes Group. Garden Homes Group employed an attorney, Mark 
Hoffman, as the company's asset manager. An accountant for Garden Homes Group, Phil 
Schiffman, worked closely with Mark Hoffman in managing the company's assets. 
7. Mark Hoffman and Phil Schiffman obtained the files and records for the K-Mart Center from 
Winding Brook Co. after the transfer. These included the leases in question here, as well as an 
abstract of pertinent data from the leases that was compiled by Winding Brook Co.. The abstract 
was used by Hoffman and Schiffrnan in their day-to-day management of the K-Mart Center (and 
other properties). Hoffman relied upon Schiffman to provide him with notice of dates requiring 
affirmative actions on the part of plaintiff under the leases. Schiffman derived a tickler system 
from the abstract to alert Hoffman and Schiffman of important dates and deadlines. Hoffman and 
Schiffman relied on the information in the abstract without comparing it to actual lease terms to 
verify its accuracy. They presumed that the abstract was accurate because it was prepared by one 
of the partner's in plaintiffs company. 
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8. In 1996 the Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT") notified the parties of its 
intention to condemn a part of the property in question for construction of an access road to 
Interstate 15. At that time Mark Hoffman reviewed part of the leases, to determine what 
plaintiffs rights were upon condemnation. 
9. On or about November 1, 1996 a letter was sent to Mark Hoffman by Joel R. Nelson. The 
letter was concerning K-Mart's need for a reduction in rent because of the amount of property to 
be condemned by UDOT. However, the letter contained a paragraph that put Mark Hoffman on 
notice of the need to look into the terms for the exercise of the option. The letter states: "The 
current lease expires August 1, 1998. If the option to renew the lease is exercised the new rent I 
understand will be $20,400/month " 
10. UDOT filed the condemnation action against the property in March of 1997. There was a 
dispute between the plaintiff and the defendants as to whether or not plaintiff should receive part 
of the condemnation proceeds. The parties discussed the possibility of reducing plaintiff's rent 
during the option periods if plaintiff would agree to disclaim any interest in the condemnation 
proceeds. 
11. On or about April 17, 1998 Mark Hoffman reviewed the terms of the leases to ascertain 
how the rents should be reduced during the option periods. At that time Mark Hoffman 
discovered that the terms of the leases required plaintiff to give 150 days written notice prior to 
the end of the lease to exercise the option to renew the leases. This caused Mark Hoffman and 
Phil Schiffman to check the tickler system and the abstract, to see if the option deadline was in 
those documents. The option deadline was not mentioned in either document. Plaintiff alleges, 
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and there is no evidence to the contrary, that this is the only material error found to date in the 
tickler system and abstract. 
12. On April 17, 1998 Mark Hoffiman sent notices to defendants of plaintiff s intent to exercise 
its options. The notices were received by the defendants on April 22, 1998. Thus, the notice 
provided by plaintiff was at least 50 days late, as the leases required that the notice be sent no 
later than 150 days prior to the end of the lease term. As mentioned above, March 3, 1998 was 
150 days prior to the end of the lease terms. 
13. Between April 22, 1998 and July 15, 1998 plaintiff and defendants were in agreement as to 
how they should settle their dispute over the proceeds from the condemnation action. They 
agreed that plaintiff would give up any right to the proceeds, and in return defendants would 
reduce the rents during the future option periods. 
14. At some time between April 22, 1998 and July 15, 1998 defendants requested and plaintiff 
paid for sewer assessments and a slope easement, which brought the property current on these 
items through December 31, 1998, which is approximately five months into the first option 
period. 
15. Between April 22, 1998 and July 15, 1998 the defendants did not take any action to assume 
liabilities, obligations or responsibilities in relation to the property. 
16. On July 15, 1998 defendants Olson sent a letter to plaintiff, informing plaintiff that its 
notice to exercise the option was not effective because it was not timely, and indicating that the 
only way for the relationship to continue between the parties was to renegotiate the rental value 
of the property. 
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17. On July 17, 1998 defendant Security Investment LTD. sent a letter to plaintiff, informing 
plaintiff that its notice to exercise the option was not effective because it was not timely, and 
setting forth terms under which plaintiff could continue to lease the property if it so desired. 
18. On or about December 16, 1998 defendants' attorney served a Notice to Quit upon 
plaintiff, informing them that they were in unlawful detainer of the property, because the options 
had not been validly exercised. 
19. On or about March 4, 1999 plaintiffs filed a formal disclaimer of any right to the 
condemnation proceeds. The disclaimer states that plaintiffs agreement to forego any right to the 
condemnation proceeds was based on defendants' agreement to reduce the rent during the option 
periods. 
20. Plaintiff continues to manage the property and collect rents from the subtenants. Pursuant 
to Court order, plaintiff pays the expenses of managing the property out of the rents paid by the 
subtenants, and submits any net profit to the clerk of the court. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
There are three legal issues before the Court. The first issue is whether Utah law gives 
trial courts power to grant equitable relief to a lessee who has failed to timely exercise an option 
to extend its lease. The second issue presumes that Utah law provides for such equitable relief, 
and is an inquiry into whether or not the plaintiff has satisfied all of the requirements to avail itself 
of that equitable relief. The third and final issue is whether the conduct of the defendants in this 
case amounts to a waiver of their right to receive timely written notice of plaintiff s intent to 
exercise the options. 
6 
Before proceeding with its analysis of the three legal issues set forth above, the Court 
notes that Utah law requires strict compliance with the option terms of a lease. Geisdorfv, 
Doughty. 972 P.2d 67, 70-71 (Utah 1998). Furthermore, it is undisputed that plaintiff failed to 
strictly comply with the option terms of the two leases at issue here. Thus, plaintiff can only 
obtain relief from its failure to strictly comply with the option terms if there is an equitable remedy 
available. If there is an equitable remedy available, then plaintiff must have satisfied all of the 
requirements to avail itself of the equitable remedy. 
The Court concludes that Utah law does provide an equitable remedy for a lessee who has 
failed to strictly comply with the option terms of a lease. The Utah Supreme Court has expressly 
recognized "that there are instances in which deviation from strict compliance may be equitably 
excused." Geisdorf at 71. Counsel for defendants correctly states in his post-trial brief that the 
Supreme Court did not need to rely on its discussion of equitable relief to deny the plaintiff there 
relief, as he did not request equitable relief. However, the Court does not believe that the 
Supreme Court's discussion of equitable relief in Geisdorf can be dismissed offhand as mere 
obiter dictum. The Supreme Court's discussion of equitable relief was made to explain or even 
justify the application of the strict compliance rule. The Supreme Court recognizes, as have the 
appellate courts of many other states, that in some cases the strict application of a rule of law 
would be inequitable, and that in those cases courts can use their equitable powers to render 
appropriate relief. The statements made by the Supreme Court in Geisdorf were made to give 
trial courts direction on how and when equitable relief should be granted. 
Having concluded that equitable relief is available under Utah law, the Court must 
determine the standard for granting equitable relief. Then the Court must go on to determine 
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whether the facts before the Court are such that plaintiff is entitled to equitable relief. First, a 
lessee "may be excused from strict compliance . . . when the [lessee's] 'conduct in failing to 
comply was not due to willful or gross negligence on the part of the [lessee] but was rather the 
result of an honest and justifiable mistake.'" Geisdorf at 71 (quoting Cattle Feeders, Inc. v. 
Jordan, 549 S.W.2d 29, 33 (Tex. App. 1977)). While the Utah Supreme Court did not further 
develop the equitable relief standard, other courts have determined that if a lessee has failed to 
strictly comply with the option terms of a lease because of mere negligence, the court should not 
automatically grant equitable relief. Rather, the court must further analyze the facts of the case 
and grant relief only where: 1) the delay in providing written notice has been slight; 2) the loss to 
the lessor is small; and 3) to refuse equitable relief would result in unconscionable hardship to the 
lessee. F.B. Fountain Co. v. Stein, 118 A. 47, 50 (Conn. 1922). Finally, Geisdorf further 
provides that trial courts can provide equitable relief'"where the strict compliance was prevented 
by some act of the [lessor] such as waiver or misleading representations or conduct.'" Geisdorf at 
71 (quoting Cattle Feeder's, Inc. at 33). 
The first factual determination the Court must make is whether plaintiffs failure to strictly 
comply with the option terms of the lease was due to willful or gross negligence, or whether it 
was the result of an honest and justifiable mistake. At the outset the Court notes that the facts of 
this case make it difficult to simply state that plaintiff was willfully or grossly negligent, or that 
plaintiff was merely negligent. There are no discrete jcaiegories of behavior into whkh-^intiff s 
behavior clearly fits^ Rather, there is a continuum between mere negligence and willful or gross 
negligence, and the Court must determine whether plaintiffs conduct is closer to willful or gross 
negligence on that continuum, or whether it is closer to mere negligence. 
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It is axiomatic that negligence is the failure to exercise the standard of care that a 
reasonably prudent person would exercise under the circumstances Cooper v Evans 262 P 2d 
278, 280 (Utah 1953) Though not specifically defined as such by Utah case law, willful 
negligence has been defined elsewhere as being "voluntary " F B Fountain Co at 492 Finally, 
Utah law defines gross negligence as follows "'Gross negligence is the failure to observe even 
slight care, it is carelessness or recklessness to a degree that shows utter indifference to the 
consequences that may result" Atkin Wright & Miles v Mountain States Tel & Tel Co , 709 
P 2d 330, 335 (Utah 1985)(quoting Robinson Ins And Real Estate, Inc v Southwestern Bell Tel 
Co_,366FSupp 307,311 (WD Ark 1973)) The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut 
referred to willful and gross negligence together by using the term "culpable negligence " FB 
Fountain Co at 49 
Turning to the facts of this case, the Court concludes that the negligence of plaintiffs 
employees, Mark Hoffman and Phil Schiffman, was closer to willful or gross negligence than it 
was to mere negligence Both of these individuals are professionals Mark Hoffman is an 
attorney, and Phil Schiffman is an accountant They make a living by managing commercial 
properties for the plaintiff As professionals, they are held to a higher standard than non-
professionals. Thus, while it was convenient for them to rely on the abstract provided to them by 
Winding Brook Company to give them all pertinent information concerning the leases in question, 
it was grossly negligent for them to fail to read the leases to discover how to exercise the options 
Both Mark Hoffman and Phil Schiffman were aware of the fact that the 25 year leases would 
2
 The Utah Supreme Court has noted that the term "willful" "implies something in addition to 
mere negligence " Salas v Industrial Common of Utah, 564 P 2d 1119, 1120 (Utah 1977) 
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expire on July 31, 1998. They knew this long before March 3, 1998. Both Hoffman and 
Schiffinan knew that there were five-year options available under the leases. They discussed the 
options with the defendants. They negotiated rents for the option periods pursuant to the 
condemnation proceeding. Furthermore, both Hoffman and Schiffman knew or should have 
known that the abstract did not tell them how to exercise their options under the leases. They 
both knew that options had to be exercised according to certain terms, because their subtenants 
exercised options with them. Despite the knowledge Hoffman and Schiffman had of the need to 
find out how to properly exercise the options, neither of them took the time to read the leases to 
obtain this information. Their failure to read the lease until 45 days after the option deadline had 
passed was the primary, if not sole, cause of their failure to provide timely written notice to the 
defendants. The Court cannot in good conscience conclude that the failure of two professionals 
to read their leases is mere negligence. Rather, the Court concludes that their failure to read the 
leases was failure to exercise even slight care. It was carelessness that shows utter indifference to 
the consequences that resulted. Plaintiffs employees were grossly negligent, and equity will not 
intervene to rescue them from their culpable negligence. 
The final issue the Court must address is whether the conduct of the defendants amounts 
to a waiver of their right to notice according to the express terms of the lease. The Utah Supreme 
Court in Geisdorf clarified the standard for waiver in these cases. "A waiver is the intentional 
relinquishment of a known right. To constitute waiver, there must be an existing right. . . a 
knowledge of its existence, and an intention to relinquish it." Geisdorf at 72. Furthermore, trial 
courts are to "assess the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the relinquishment is 
clearly intended. Any waiver must be distinctly made, although it may be express or implied." Id. 
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Finally, where the alleged waiver is merely to be implied, trial courts are "to be especially careful 
in their examination of the evidence. Id. 
Turning to the facts of this case, the Court first notes that there is no allegation that any of 
the defendants expressly waived their rights to notice under the terms of the leases. Thus, the 
Court must carefully assess the totality of the circumstances to see whether the defendants clearly 
intended to relinquish their rights to notice. 
Plaintiff argues that three facts indicate that the defendants waived their right to timely 
notice. First, the defendants did not object to plaintiffs tardy notice until at least July 15, 1998. 
Apparently it is plaintiffs position that defendant's silence on the issue between April 22, 1998 
and July 15, 1998 amounts to a waiver of the defendants' right to timely notice. Second, the 
defendants negotiated with plaintiff for a reduction in rents during the option periods. The 
implication plaintiff seeks to derive from this is that defendants had implicitly accepted plaintiffs 
tardy notice, and had determined to allow them to exercise the options despite the late notice. 
Finally, on July 8, 1998, defendant Security Investment LTD. asked plaintiff to pay sewer 
assessments up through December 31, 1998, which is five months into the option period. 
Plaintiffs contend that defendant Security Investment LTD. would not have made this request if it 
had intended to enforce the option terms of the lease. Plaintiff argues that these facts, taken 
together, demonstrate that defendants intended to waive their right to timely notice, or is at least 
inconsistent with any other intent. 
In analyzing the facts of this case, the Court notes that "[m]ere silence is not a waiver 
unless there is some duty or obligation to speak." Geisdorf at 72. The parties here were dealing 
with one-another at arms-length, and defendants did not have a duty or obligation to speak to 
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plaintiff immediately upon receipt of the tardy notice. Thus, the fact that defendants were silent 
for almost three months after plaintiff filed its tardy notice cannot be used to demonstrate an 
implied waiver. 
The Court notes that it is difficult to decide whether or not the negotiation of the parties 
as to the reduction of rents during the option periods demonstrates that defendants clearly 
intended to waive their right to timely notice. The Court concludes that this fact does not provide 
sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that defendants clearly intended to waive their right 
to timely notice. When the parties were negotiating the future rent reductions, they were not 
discussing the issue of whether or not plaintiff should have to provide timely notice. Rather, they 
were negotiating a settlement of a long-time dispute between the parties concerning the proceeds 
of a condemnation proceeding. Thus, their discussions cannot be seen as an implied waiver of 
their rights to timely notice. Furthermore, the Court notes that the negotiations between the 
parties is not whatjaused plaintifftQ-fail taprovide timely^notice. Rather, the sole cause of 
plaintiffs failure to provide timelv notice was the failure of Mark Hoffman and Phil Schiflman to 
read the leases. If the parties' negotiations had caused plaintiff to be luiiedintojalse security, and 
thus caused plaintiff to fail to orovide timelv notice, the equities would weigh more heavily in 
favor of plaintiff. 
Next, the Court concludes that defendant Security Investment, LTD.'s request that 
plaintiff pay the sewer assessments through December 31, 1998 is not sufficient to demonstrate a 
clear intent to waive the right to timely notice. It could be seen as a tacit admission that plaintiff 
would still have rights under the leases beyond the original July 31, 1998 termination date. 
However, the Court notes that there is no evidence that the person asking plaintiff tojpay the 
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sewer assessment was thinking about the exercise of the options when they made this request. 
Under the terms of the leases plaintiff was required to pay all assessments, taxes etc. Thus, it is 
not unreasonable to conclude that defendant Security Investment, LTD. became aware of an 
assessment that was due, and simply asked plaintiff to pay it. 
When the Court considers all of the facts together, it is not convinced that defendants 
clearly and unambiguously intended to waive their rights to timely notice. There is one weakness 
shared by all of these facts that leads the Court to conclude that defendants did not make a clear 
and unambiguous waiver. There is no evidence that the various defendants knew that they had a 
right to timely notice at the time the various defendants acted or failed to act as alleged by 
plaintiff. For the Court to find waiver, the defendants must have had: 1) a right to timely notice; 
2) knowledge of their right to timely notice; and 3) an intention to relinquish their right to timely 
notice. The Court finds that it is reasonable to conclude from the facts before the Court that the 
defendants did not know of the 150 day notice requirement until their attorney made them aware 
of it on or about July 15, 1998. And even if the facts do not allow the Court to affirmatively 
conclude that the defendants did not know of their right to demand timely notice until on or about 
July 15, 1998, the Court can affirmatively state that there is no evidence that the defendants had 
knowledge of their right to strictly enforce the option provision. Thus, plaintiff cannot obtain 
relief under a waiver theory, because plaintiff has failed to prove that the defendants had 
knowledge of their rights under the option clause. 
Pursuant to the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Court concludes that 
plaintiff is not entitled to the equitable relief sought. Plaintiff is to surrender possession of the 
property to defendants immediately. All of the funds placed in Court are to be delivered to the 
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defendants. However, any expenditures plaintiff made prior to August 1, 1998, that provide a 
benefit to defendants beyond the termination of the leases, are to be refunded to plaintiff. Counsel 
for defendants is directed to prepare a proposed form of order consistent with the Court's ruling 
and present it to counsel for plaintiff pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Rules of Judicial 
Administration. 
Dated April / / , 2000. 
BY THE COURT: 
y£*^z^w 
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GROUVO LMtt £ 
IlilS L£\SE nude and entered into'as of this /*7 day of rjfy4#>' 
IU7>U^ by ani between WILLIAM K. OLSON, Landlord, or.d BMiiJARA L." GLSOtf, 
Lis wi;:o, oJ 1090 East llillbi\Dok Way, Bountiful, Utah, wife of Landlord., 
and C 5 W Kfl>2H^ I7AN ASSOCIATES, a Limted Partnership, of 3H31 V.'^ ct Alcona 
Street| Houston, Texas (Tenant). 
WETKE3SETII THAT: 
1, Landlord, for and in consideration of the rents to be paid and 
the covenants and agreements to be kept and parformad by Tenant, dees hereby 
lease to Tenant the premises situated in Davis County, State of Utah, as ii* 
nora particularly described on Exhibit "A" attached.hereto and nv*Je a pari: 
hereof and typified on Exhibi.t "B" attached hereto and made a part hcrso.f. 
The property covered by such legal description is hereinafter referred vo as 
the "demised preridses!^ 
2* Tenant shall have and hold the demised premises and properly with 
the rights, privileges and appurtenances thereto belonging, or in any v/ise 
appertaining thereto, for and during a term of twenty five years c£:nixur:i:ij? 
o^UIUai^t / ffl3 and tenrixating ™tfj'&f 3/ 1 9 ^ , unless 
. V0' scone^^e^dnfiy^'urider the terms and conditions of this Lease, The phrase. 
"lease term1' p^sedi in this Lease shall be the term of this Lease, ar.d any ex-
tension thereof pursuant'to'Article 22 hereof, 
3, Tenant hereto hirves said demised premises for tlie term herein men-
tioned and, in consideration of tlie peaceful use and enjoyment of the demised 
premises and the performance of all of the terms and provisions thereof to be 
perforrcxl by the Landlord, does hereby covenant and agree to pay Landlord> as 
rental for said prenu.ses, for the initial twenty five years, the sum of Ten 
Thousand Five Hundred Dollars (010,500.00) per*' annum, payable annually 
in advance on the first day of each lease year throughout the lease tern be^innin^. 
on xhe first day of the month during v;hich Tenant or its Subtenant opens for 
business, but in no event later tnan t.;e /f)j day of
 (C(.(l. 4 tt^f 197L?, 
<k 
plus. 38.2 % of onc-thii\l of a#jy over-ride rentals paid to the tenant under the 
provisions of the Krcsge Lease which shall be paid by tenant to . Ir.r'* Vw1. withrlr, 
* and 38,# of one third of any override rentals paid by other aubtet .,a or 
7 J 38 • # of one third of one percent of all sales made by other occupants of 
demised premises whichever is greater (applies also to 22. (c)(1) ) 
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THIS L£\SE made and entered into as of the /*7 day of fjti4ty>' 
Vf/Ji-^ by ani between WILLIAM K. OLSON, Landlord, and &\U!?.AKA L. GLSOrt,' 
Jii^  wi;:e, of 109G East Ilillbrcok Way* Bountiful, Utah, wife of Landjf.rcL, 
and C 6 W &VIHW7AN /ASSOCIATES, a Limited Partnership, of 3H31 V.^ st AlC-ora 
Street, Houston, Texas (Tenant). 
WITNESSETH THAT: 
1. Landlord, for and in consideration of the rents to be paid and 
the covenants and agreements to be kept and performed by Tenant dce.> hereby 
lease to Tenant the premises situated in Davis County, State cf Utah, as ii 
mora particularly described on Exhibit ,fA" attached hereto and made a part 
hereof and typified on Exriibi.t "B" attached hereto and made a part nor so'* • 
The property covered by such legal description is hereinafter referred vo <\s 
the "demised premises11. 
2« Tenant shall have and hold the demised premises and' property with 
the rights, privileges and appurtenances thereto belonging, or in any wise 
appertaining thereto, for and during a term of twenty five years ccn^e^in^ 
31 18?^» unless 
t h i s Lease, The phrase. 
" lease tenn11 Sfe^tiscd, in t h i s Lease sha l l be the term of t h i s Lease ard <,ny 'in-
tens ion thereof pursuant- to A r t i c l e 22 hereof. 
3, Tenant he re to h i r e s said demised premises for the texm here in men-
tioned and, in considerat ion of the peaceful use and enjoyment of the dv-n.iscrd 
premises and t h e performance of a l l of the terms ard provisions thereof t o be 
performed by the Landlord, does hereby covenant and agree t o pay Landlord* as 
r e n t a l for said premises, for the i n i t i a l twenty f ive yea r s , t h e sum of Ten 
Thousand Five Ilundixd [ b l l a r s (010,500.00) per annum, payable annually 
in advance on the f i r s t day of each lease year throughout the lease t e r n be^.i*u\;'.n,7 
on xhe f i r s t cay "of the month during which Tenant o r i t s Subtenant opens for 
business , but in no event l a t e r tnan t . e / / ) T day of /{jj'4 l t^l^t VflSy 
plus. 38.2 % of one- third cf a#jy over-r ide r e n t a l s paid t o the tenant under the 
provisions of the Krcspe Lease which sha l l be paid by tenant t o I r r ^ " ' ^ ^ within 
* and 38.25^ of one th i rd of any override renta ls paid by other subter ,a or 
38.2£ of one th i rd of one percent of a l l sales made by other occupants of 
demised premises whichever i s greater (applies also to 22. (c)(1) ) 
appertaining t h e r e t o , f r and during  term f t enty 
4$f o a U M U & f , / > J a 7 3 and t«nnir.ating °^UuIu-
, V° sooner^emuia^ed 'under the terms and conditions of  
Thirty diys following receipt of the over-ride rental by tenant, 
H, (a) Tenant agrees, at its own expense, comiencing on the date 
of commencement of the lease term, to pay to the public authorities charged 
with the collection "thereof, promptly as the same become due and payable, 
all taxes, general and special, assessments and other public charges made 
upon or assessed against the demised premises and any building, structures 
or improvements now or hereafter located thereon, or arising in respect of 
the occupancy, use or possession cf the demised premises u\d which are 
assessed and are or become a lien during the continuance of this Lease* 
Further, Tenant agrees to pay all other charges, costs, expenses, liens, 
water rents, rates and license fees, including but not limited to water, 
electricity, gas, telephone, sewer, other utilities, etc,., to the end that 
rents shall be received by Landlord unabated by any such charges* Tenant 
agrees to remit promptly to Landlord, copies of paid receipts with respect 
to taxes, and on demand, receipts evidencing payment of all assessments or 
other public charges so payable by Tenant, All such taxes ^  for the first and ^ 0 . 
last year of the term hereof shall be equitably prorated between the parties. 
(b)' Tenant shall not be obligated, however, to pay any income 
tax, profits tax, excise tax or other tax or charge that may be payable by 
or chargeable to Landlord 'Wider any present or future law of the United 
States of "the Stat^rin,which the demised premises are located, or imposed 
by any political taxing subdivision thereof or -any governmental agency, upon 
or with respect to the rent received by Landlorvi under this Lease or upon the 
right of Landlord to 'receive such rents or to do business. 
(c) Tenant shall not be obligated to pay any inheritance o?ans-
. fer, estate, succession or other similar tax or charge that may be payable 
under any present or future lav; of the United States or the said State or 
imposed by any political taxing subdivision thereof or by any other govern-
mental agency, by reason of the devolution, succession, transfer, passing by 
inheritance, devise, acquisition or becoming effective of the right to 
possession and enjoyment of all or a part of the estate of Landlord in said 
premises, whether by descent, daed, testamentary provision, trust deed, gi ft, 
mortgage, or otherwise. 
9. 
(d) Tenant shall not be required to pay, discharge or remove 
any tax assessment, tax lien, forfeiture, or other imposition or cliarge 
upon or against said premises or any part thereof or the improvements at 
any time situaied thereon so long as Tenant shall, in good faith, contest 
the same or the validity thereof by appropriate legal proceedings which 
shall operate to prevent the collection of the taxf assessments, forfeiture, 
lien or imposition so contested and to prevent the sale of said premises or 
any part thereof to satisfy the same. Pending any such legal proceedings, 
landlord shall not have the right to pay, remove or discharge the tax, 
assessment, forfeiture, lien or imposition thereby contested, provided 
Tenant shall, prior to the date such tax or imposition is due and payable, 
have given such reasonable security as may be demanded by Landlord or toake 
payment under protest to insure such payments and prevent any sale or for-
feiture, or lien, including any penalties and interest charges thereon 
imposed by law* 
(e) Any proceeding or proceedings for contesting the validity 
or amount of taxes, assessments or other public charges or to recover back 
any tax, assessment or other imposition paid by Tenant, may be brought by 
Tenant in the name of Landlord, or in the name of Tenant, or both, as Tenant 
may deem advisable«, but without financial obligation to Landlord, 
(f) -If Tenant shall default in the payment of any taxes, assess-
ments or public charges above required to be paid by Tenant, or fail to 
maintain the required security for any part thereof being contested, Land-
lord shall have the right to pay the same together with any penalties and 
interest, in which event the amount so paid by Landlord shall be reimbursed 
by Tenant, on demand, together with interest thereon at the maximum non-
usurious rate r ' l;..':l.:.,....l."'r."ir."l'-r-. ^ — .-.: •-^\ from the date ofy^K^ 
payment by Landlord, ^ ^J^ 
(g) Any taxes paid by Tenant in advance covering a period extend-
ing beyond the date of expiration of the final term of this Lease shall be pro-
rated between Tenant and Landlord. 
5* This Lease is expressly conditioned upon: 
U ) VIul UnilorxJ Idir.rJx for examination by Tenant, a certified 
abstract of title covering the demised premises , certified to a date just priop/?C 
to the date of closing of this Lease, or a policy of title insurance with a jl% 
reputable title insurance company, showing that title to the demised premises 
is an unencumbered, marketable title, and that such premises are free of any 
'liens, encumbrances and easements except such easements as may be necessary 
to furnish sewers and public utilities to the demised premises. 
"".£>T V.iCi demised premises arc* vacant* 
r
 , 'Vi .Vr-diorJ. ajivec cha's; Jie V^?;.-c L ;aay, 1'roji tine to time, and. 
at any time during t:ie i.erM l.eivof, „:* ics cc^e discretion and at its own 
cost and expense, construct: up*.. •. ^. , crvy p.:xt of the demised premises, 
new buildings and improvements uAon r^ e following conditions: 
(a) All innprovements and new hri: Jjngs s\r.ll be of a good and 
substantial character and such as will lwt tend to decrease the value of the 
land hereby demised. 
(b) That Tenant shall pay for all labor performed .and materials 
furnished in or aluit i <.c 'jLV.crt.ion a:„ construction of ruch buildings and 
improvements
 t av* i crp tna demised p/vjrises and buildings and, improvements 
thereon at all tin^s free; and clear :,_ ail liens for labor or materials • fur-
nished in andx>about such erT-ctieri an.; construction, and will defendj at its 
own cosr and eirpen^c, c. oh ^r.i ^/ery *ien asserted or claim filed against 
said premises and/or the buildings or improvements thereon, or any part 
thereof, for labor claimed tcr have been .so performed or material claimed to 
• have been so furnished, and promptly pay each and every judgment made or 
given against said premises, or any part thereof, or the buildings and/or 
improvements thereon, and/or against Landlord or the Tenant, on account of 
any such-lien and indemnify aid save harmless the Landlord, their successors 
and assigns, from all and every claim and action on account of such claim, 
lien or judgment. Tnat no construction shall be commenced without a completion 
and performance bond by a corporate surety saving the Landlord and the leased 
premises harmless from any and all claims of creditors of any kind and sufficient 
to satisfy the Contractor's landing requirement of the State of Utah, A>UI <j~<i>,v.n !<:;.;, 
(c) All such construction and the completed buildings shall comply J*\ 
with all laws and ordinances relating thereto. -TTT~"~ 
(d) No building shall be demolished or substantially reduced 
in value during the final five (S) years of the lease term or any renewal 
term, except if same is destroyed by fire or other casualty. Nothing in 
this paragraph shall abrogate any of the requirements of Article 7 and 
Article 10 of this lease. 
(e) To finance the construction of such improvements if and 
when they may be constructed, the Tenant shall have the right to borrow 
money for such purposes for both interim and end financing. The terms 
and conditions of such mortgage (s) shall be in the sole discretion of 
Tenant. Such loan(s) may be secured by Tenant assigning to the mortgagee(s) 
Tenant's interest in this lease. 
(f). It is further understood and agreed that Landlord will sub-
ordinate its fee title or leasehold interest to construction mortgage loans . 
become t '« •» and or permanent mortgages upon the improvements
 f< provided they do not i 
•Vkflt five ^ » r , V , M U ' / u i ' C t / V>r,)cl in K;,\ C t»>i ^ t J ^ ' O ; ** .a \" \ fzc/\\ S \ 
» "- "" -' M> personally liable for such indebtedness, and provided, the Landlord is given 
copies of all such transactions in advance of signing; and is allowed to partici<_^r^ 
pate in supervision of 1±IQ distribution of the funds to assure payment for all 
improvements, and provided further that upon any foreclosure the Landlord may 
with the other Landowner whose property secures the mortgage, succeed to all 
..<*£* "*- < - <* 
L \ right, title'and interest, but no obligation, of tenant in the mortgaged premisesi 
n / 7.? With respect to any buildings, structures or improvements at any 
k/^°time constructed or erected by Tenant on the demised premises, Tenant shall: 
(a) Have the right, at its own expense, during the term hereof, 
to remodel, alter, add to or modify structurally or otherwise, the buildings 
and improvements situated on the demised premises; provided, however, that 
before such remodeling, alteration, addition or modification be made, the 
Tenant complies with all those requirements set forth in Article 6 (a), (b), 
(c), (d), (e) and (f) above and all other applicable provisions in this Lease 
enumerated. 
(b) At all times during rhe term of this Lease maintain fire and 
extended coverage insurance on all buildings and improvements erected the con-
structed upon the demised premises in insurance companies of generally recog-
nized responsibility and credit, and authorized to do business in the State 
of Utah, in the full insurable value thereof and in an amount equal to not 
less than seventy percent (70%) of the full insurable value when there is 
no lien> with a loss payable clause naming as beneficiaries both Tenant 
and Landlord as their interest nay appear. Certificates of such policies 
of insurance shall be given to Landlord promptly upon issuance• In the 
event of loss or damage by fire or other casualty* Tenant shall repair' 
such damage and restore the building so damaged so thc.t the bo;i«e L-s a\ ^ 
good condition as prior to such damage or destruction, M l ^ums ari^:.g 
by reason of loss under said insurance 'policies shall le available to 
Tenant for the reconstruction' or repairing, as the ca.se nay be, : f tuy 
building or buildings injured or destroyed, by fire cr other ir.iju.--^ : risks• 
Should any amount of such insurance proceeds remain ci."i *•.-;• completion and 
payment for the work 'performed, such amount, if Tenant be not .in, default 
under the terms of this Lease, shall 1« retained by and belong to Tenant* 
(e) Tenant agrees that all buildings, structures and improve-
ments shall comply with all laws and ordinances relating thereto, 
P, The demised premises may be used by Tenant for any lawful pur-
ix>y<' • 
9. Tenant shall have the right to assign and transfer this Lease 
or any interest therein, and Tenant shall have the further right /to siiblet, 
frcm time* to.time,. ther; demised premises or any part thereof; provided, how-
ever, that ncrfassiignment shall constitute a "novation", unless Tenant shall 
assign and transfer the Tenant's interest in this Lease on the following 
conditions: 
(a) That any such Assignee is a party having, a bona 
fide net worth of not less than One Million Five Hundred 
Thousand ($1,500$,000,00) Dollars and that such Assignee 
shall assume all obligations of Tenant 1 lereunder and agrees 
to be bound by the terms of this Lease., 
(b) That Tenant shall have completed and fully paid 
for all the improvements required by its sublease with 
S, S« Kresge Company, comprising not less than sixty four 
thousand" (84,000) square feet of building-on this property 
and property adjacent to the premises and all on-site improve-
ments ,. 
w. 
(c) That S. S. Krosge Company has occupied the 
buildings under a sublease from Tenant wherein the here-
in described premises are included as a necessary and 
integral part of the S. S. Kresge Company leasehold for a 
term of not less than twenty five (25) years. 
10. With respect to any buildings ,. structures or improvements 
constructed on the demised premises by Tenant, Tenant covenants and agree 
that it will, at its own expense! during the continuance of this Lease, 
keep such buildifigs, structures and improvements in good repair, and at t 
expiration of the term, or any renewal or extension thereof, yield and 
deliver up the same in good condition, reasonable wear and use thereof an 
damage by the elements or other cause of casualty not customarily insured 
against by fire and extended coverage insurance policy excepted. 
11. Tenant agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the Landlord 
frcen any liability for damages to any person or property in, on, about 
or in connection with said demised premises from any cause whatsoever*, 
and Tenant will procure and keep in effect during the term hereof adequate 
personal injury and property damage liability insurance naming Landlord as 
an additional insured and shall reasonably deliver copies of certificates oi 
memoranda of such insurance to Landlord. 
12. In the event that the estate created hereby shall be taken ij 
execution or by other process of law, or if Tenant shall be adjudicated ii 
solvent or bankrupt pursuant to the provisions of emy state or federal in-
solvency or bankruptcy act, or if a receiver or trustee of the property o 
Tenant shall be appointed by reason of Tenant's insolvency or inability tc 
pay its debts, or if any assignment shall be made of Tenant's property foi 
the benefit of creditors, then and in any of such events, Landlord may, ai 
Landlord's option, terminate this Lease and all rignts of Tenant hereundei 
by giving to Tenant notice in writing of the election of Landlord to so 
terminate; provided, however, if: 
(a) The order of court creating any of the disabilities 
enumerated in this article be not final by reason of pendency of the 
proceedings or appeal frcm such order; or 
(b) Tenant shall become a debtor seeking corporate or other 
reorganisation under the terir.3 of Chapter 10 of the present National Bank-
ruptcy Act or any other .similar bankruptcy act, or any other similar pro-
visions of any present or future act; then Landlord shall rot have, the 
right to terminate and cancel this Lease by reason of any of the dis-' 
abilities enumerated herein, so long as Tenant pays to Landlord all amounts 
payable by Tenant to Landlord hereunder in full as and vhij.n the same become 
due and payable, 
(c) Lease be terminated in pursuance hereoi ,, Lajrllord reserves 
all 1 lis rights and remedies against Tenant to the same extent as .if such 
Lease w(,- : : ^ * terminated. 
Zx. is hereby agreed that in the event of Tenant herein holding 
over aftc' tr^ termination of this Lease, .thereafter the tenancy shall be 
from month to month in the absence of a vjritten agreement to the contrary. 
14. In the event default shall be made by Tenant in the payment of 
rent upon the day it becomes due and payable and such default continues for 
a period cf ten (10) days after date of mailing to Tenant of written notice 
thereof, as per paragraph 25 hereof, or if default shall 'be made or suffered 
by Tenant in any of the other covenants and conditions of this Lease required 
to be kept or performed by Tenant (other than payment of rent) and Tenant 
fails to cure such default or defaults within sixty- (60) days after mailing 
to Tenant of written notice from Landlord specifying the default or defaults 
complained of, then and in any such event or events, and whenever and as 
often as such failure or default shall occur, Landlord may pursue any remedies 
allowed by law and it shall and may be lawful for Landlord, at Landlord' s 
election, at any time thereafter to re-enter into and repossess the premises and 
the 'building(s) and improvements situated thereon, and every part thereof, and 
Tenant and each and every other occupant to remove and put out, In the event 
that.Tenant.fs default (other than non-payment of rent) is not cured within said 
\ sixty (60) day period by reason of labor troubles, war, government regulations, 
jjj / unavailability of materials, or any condition beyond Tenant's reasonable control, 
|<v the time for curing such default shall be extended accordingly. 
15. If the whole or more than ten percent (10$) of the buildings to 
be located on the combination of the leased premises and all other adjoining 
property initially leased to S. S. Kresge Company by Tenant, s)iall be 
taken by any public authority under the power of eminent domain, then 
the term of this Lease shall cease en the part so taken from the day the 
possession of that part shall be required for any public purpose , and the 
rent shall be paid up to tlat day and from that day the Tenant shall have 
the right to either cancel this Lease and declare the same null and void 
or to continue in the possession of the remainder of the same under the 
terms herein provided, except that the rent shall be reduced in proportion 
to the value of the premises taken, to the value of the remaining premises, 
and that such right to cancel or declare null and void shall expire unless exer-
cised by written notice to Landlord within sixty (60) days after the taking of 
possession for public purpose. 
If tto whole or more than ten percent (10%) of the land, comprising 
the combination of the leased premises and all other .adjoining property 
initially leased to S, S. Kresge Company by Tenant, shall be taken by any 
public authority under the power of eminent domain without suitable replace-
ment for the part so taken, then the term of this Lease, at the option of 
Tenant shall cease on the part so taken from the day -the possession of that 
part shall be required for any public purposes, and the rent shall be paid up 
to that day and from that day the Tenant shall have the right to either cancel 
this Lease and declare the same null and void or to continue in the possession 
of the remainder of the same'under the terms herein provided, except that the 
rent shall be reduced in proportion to the value of the premises taken to the 
value of the remaining premises. Notwithstanding anything contained herein to the 
contrary, neither party shall have the right to cancel this Lease, unless S.S. 
Kresge Company or its successor, as principal sole Tenant in possession, elects 
to terminate because of such taking for public purpose, and tenant shall not 
be entitled to any reduction of rental unless Kresge1 s rental is proportionately 
reduced. 
If such taking shall occur prior to the time Tenant has erected or 
constructed any building(s) or structures(s) upon the demised premises, then 
all damages awarded therefor shall belong to and be the property of the Land-
lord, whether such damages shall be awarded as compensation for diminution 
in value to the leasehold or to the fee of the premises herein leased; pro-
vided, however, that the Landlord shall not be entitled to any portion of 
the award made to Tenant for loss of business. If such taking occurs 
after Tenant has erected or constructed on the demised premises any build-
ing(s) or structure(s), then out of any damages avjarded for such taking the 
Landlord shall pay to the Tenant a sum agreed to by the parties, or a fair 
and just portion thereof, as provided by ] aw in determination of the tenant's 
interest in the condemnation award, 
3 6, Nothing in this Lease contained shall be construed as limiting 
the rights of Tenant to mortgage its interest in the demised premises and in 
the building(s) at any time thereon, it being understood that the Tenant may 
mortgage its estate or interest to secure a bona fide loan or loans of money • 
then made or about to be made to the Tenant, or to extend or renew the same, 
provided,, however, that no mortgagee nor anyone who claims by, through or 
under such mortgage shall by virtue of such mortgage enjoy any greater or more 
extended rights than the Tenant has under this Lease*, arid provided, further, 
that any such mortgage and the' rights and interests of the mortgagee and of 
all persons claiming by, through or under such mortgage, shall be in every 
respect subject and subordinate to all the conditions, privileges and coven-
ants of this Lease and the rights, powers and privileges of the Landlord here-
in, including the priority of interest of Landlord to all parties except the 
first mortgagee for improvements. 
1 7. Upon the termination of tl lis Lease, whether by lapse of time 
or otherwise, all buildings and improvements then and at such time upon 
said demised premises shall belong to Landlord. 
18. Tenant shall, at its own expanse, under penalty of forfeiture 
and damages, promptly comply with all lawful laws, orders, regulations or 
ordinances of all municipal, county and state authorities affecting the 
premises hereby leased, and the cleanliness, safety, occupation and use 
of the same. 
19. In the event that Landlord shall, during the period covered 
by this Lease, obtain possession of said premises by re-entry, summary 
proceedings, or otherwise, Tenant hereby agrees to pay Landlord the expense 
incurred in obtaining possession of said premises and also all expenses and 
commissions which may be paid in and about the letting of the same. 
,J 
20. It is agreed that each and every of tne rigncs, rsimcdias and 
benefits provided by tnis Lcc.se shall bet cumulative and shall not be ex-
clusive of any other of said rights, remedies and benefits, or of any 
other rights, remedies and benefits allowed by law. 
21. Che or nore waivers of any covenant or condition by Landlord 
shall not be construed as a waiver of a further breach of the same coven-
ant or condition. 
22. Tenant shall have the following options to extend the term of 
this Lease, and at the time of-exercise of the option the Tenant is not in 
default hereunder: 
(a) An option to extend the term for an additional period of 
five (5) years from and after the expiration of the initial lease term. 
(b) If such option is exercised. Tenant shall have five (5) 
additional, successive options to renew this Lease, each for a term of 
five (5) years and each option is conditioned upon the exercise of the re-
newal option immediately preceding. 
(c) All of the options herein granted shall be exercised by 
notice in writing to Landlord given not later than one hundred and fifty 
(ISO) days prior to the expiration of the then existing lease term, and in 
the manner hereinafter provided. 
All of the terms and conditions of this Lease shall remain in full 
force and effect during any renewal terra(s) except that the annual rental 
provided for herein shall be adjusted as of the commencement date of any 
extended terra as follows: 
(1) At and for an annual minimum rental as set forth here-
after for each option period, p\u5 of one-third (1/3) of any over-ride rentals *" 
* A 
paid to the Tenant under the provisions of the "Kresge Lease". 
(2) (i) Twelve Thousand Six Hundred Dollars ($12,600.00) 
per year for the first five year option extension per3.od beginning on the 
Co 1 ~~ day of # m ^ u s t 19??and ending on the 1 f day of O u Lj <®og 'j 
iil) Thirteen Thousard Eight Hundred Sixty Dollars ($13,860.00) 
per year for the second five year option extension period beginning on the 
, P ^ I - day of PtAr
 t^  . T- l$° Sand ending on the ] ( day of v*\ u ^j *& £<^s 
/ 
t 
(iii) fifteen Thousand Two Hundred Forty Six Dollars ($15,240.00) 
per year for the third five year option extension period beginning on the 
/ took' > 
/fff /^Q^y of A ur r,s< T j» a™* ending on the >/ day of ^JCA L 9 10 2-tf/j> 
\ y ^ (iv) Sixteen Thousand Seven Hundred Seventy and 60/100 ($16,770,60) 
per year for the fourth five year option extension period beginning on the 
JL:L. W* -::; ; V ^ ^ ^ T ^ ^ d e n d i no on the // day of xrTuL.y & V^ 
M* ,'v) Eighteen Thousand four Hundred Forty Seven and 66/100 ($18,4H7»66) 
per year for the fifth live year option extension period beginning on the 
<6^ I *-~ day rt/j« f <~< ~t~ *£- and ending on the J ( day of sj'u 'L y 19 20 £ 
^ (vi) Twenty Thousand Two Hundred Ninety Two and H3/10Q Dollars'($20,292Ji3) 
per year for* the sixth five year option extension period beginning on iho J^ ' 
^ ^ • 
day of jQurC^T~ 3b9-» and ending on the // day of yjo. , y :Jk 2-0'^-^ 
23, Landlord agrees, to execute at any tamo and from time to time, 
such agreements betv;een Landlord hereunder as Owner, Tenant hereunder, as 
Landlord, and any or all of Tenant's subtenants as~Tenant(s), covering portions 
or all of the demised premises, by which agreement(s) the Landlord (Owner) will 
agree that in the event of the termination for any reason whatsoever of this 
Lease, if the sublessee is not then in default of its sublease: 
(a) Such Subtenant(s) may remain in possession so 
.'^ /i.iCi' rh. > ..jrcw.,ii.l \i.\.y>i. 
long as obligations owing to Landlord by Tenant remain 
A 
satisfied; .and such Subtenant(s) shall attorn to and pay 
the rent to such Landlord; and 
(b) That Landlord will'notify in writing tn.e Sub-
tenant of any default by Tenant and allow Subtenant thirty 
(300 days from the date of si ich notice within which to cure 
such default, 
21-;. Tenant agrees to pursue reasonable conduct to prevent adverse 
parties fran gaining prescriptive rights and easements over the leased premises. 
25. This Lease shall be interpreted in accordance with the laws of 
the State of Utah. 
2.5, All notices provided for in this Lease shall be sent: 
To"Landlord; 1090 East Millbrook Way 
Bountiful, Utah 04010 
To Tenant; 2*; 31 West Alabama Street 
ibuston, Texas 77000 
24, Tenant agrees to pursue reasonable conduct to prevent adverse 
parties from gaining prescriptive rights and easements over the leased 
premises, 
25, This Lease shall be interpreted in eiccordance with the laws 
of the State of Utah. 
26• All notices provided for in this Lease shall be sent: 
TO Landlord: 1098 East Millbrook Way 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
TO Tenant: 3431 West Alabama Street 
Houston, Texas 77000 
and such other place or places as hereafter shall be designated in writing 
by the respective parties. Such notice shall be mailed U. S. Registered 
or Certified mail, return receipt requested, postage prepaid, 
27. Landlord covenants that Tenant, on payment of all the afore-
said installments and performing all the covenants aforesaid, shall and may 
peacefully and quietly have, hold and enjoy the said demised premises for the 
term aforesaid. 
28. Landlord and Tenant agree to execute
 :> at the time of execution 
of this lease or upon request by either party, a short form lease for re-
cording purposes, setting forth the legal description of the property, the 
term of this Lease and reference to the option to renew the Lease, 
29. The property depicted on Exhibit "B" attached hereto and made a 
part hereof is subject to conaeinnation proceedings by the State of Utah. In 
the event the State of Utah releases this property, or any part thereof, from 
the condemnation proceedings and elects to sell said property, or any part 
thereof, Landlord agrees to make a reasonable efforn: to purchase said prope. ty 
afc the best price possible. In the event the Landlord acquires said property 
or any part thereof, Landlord agrees to include so much of said property as 
adjoins the south side of leased property, but Landlord may retain any property 
south of and/or adjoining Landlord's remaining tract,under the provisions 
of tlus Lease, in consideration of "he annual rental payable under the Lease 
being increased by ooven per cent (7fl) of the valuation of the property computed 
at the rate of OM0,000,00, for each acre added to the Lsase. 
30. The covenants, conditions and agreements of this Lease shall La 
Lix.ding u^on and ^lall inure to the benefit of the heirs, representatives, 
successors and assigns of the .polities hereto, 
31, Landlord and Tenant agree to cooperate in allowing reasonable 
access for ingress and egress to and fran their respective leased and 
retained tracts, 
IN WITNESS IHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused these presents 
to be executed all as of the day and year first above written. 
WILLILAM K. OLSON 
LANDLORD 
ft-A,- * £••<, , 
BARBARA L. OLSON 
WIFE OF LANDLORD 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF DAVIS ) ss. 
C £ W MANHATfAN ASSOCIATES, a 
Limited Partnership ^ ^ _ _ 
TENANT 
On this v"| day of \)ccr: CM l^ r 197 \, before me personally appeared 
William K. Olson and Barbara L. Olson, his wife, to me known to be the persons 
described in and who executed the within instrument and acknowledged that they 
executed the same as their free act and deed, \ 
J$y cornnission expires: 
( \ NOTARY PUBLIC 
STATE OF TAXES ) 
ss. 
COUtflY OF HARRIS ) 
> 
- , On this &Ci/ day of 
C't W HanhattanAssociates, c 
/ 
UJJLJ. , . 
/to me known to.be a general partner of 
^art 
19^> before me personally appeared 
a Limited^Partnership, who executed the witliin instru-
ment and acknowledged that he executed the same for and on behalf of C 8 W 
Manhattan Associates as a general partner, 
NOTARY PUBLIC ~J^ 'JuL 
ny commission expires: R i d i n g efc / , / 
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EXWniT B 
oaid lowed prcwlGco or ony pr»r£ th::roof, but in no Gtfent loxo\: 
t;hr.n the 7.0 C acy or ££:£/, 1573, plus (51,67, of cr.o-third o£! ar,y 
sdd ic icus l or cvor-rido ronttsie paid or accruina to tho 'itennnt 
tntfor tho provisions of the Erc3ga Losso/which oUall bo paid by 
Tenant to Landlord within t h i r t y (30) days following tha date utors 
tho oorco bocoas due end poyabXo to Vlonr.nt under cs id KrcbfcO Locso. 
4« (&) Toasut ajjeooo, a t i t o ova onponao, coswasneitts err 
tfca date on which th lc Ground Lsaso to executed by LoGOor, t o pay 
t o tho pcblic nuthor i t ioo chargod with the c o l l e c t i o n thereof , 
promptly GO tho ones becorco duo cud pnyabio, e l l tazcoo, c©as::oi cod 
e p e c i a i , Goscscr:3ttto and othor public chargoc made upon or cocooood 
c&ainflt tho dcralcttd prcdoafl sad cny bu i ld ing , otructurco or icprcvG? 
rccuto twro or horcaftor ioeetod thereon, or o r l a i n s in roopoct of tho 
occupancy, uso or poaccccion of tho domiccd proraio'sa and which c;ro 
coccscod ond ore or bocourt fl l ion during tho continuance of t h i s 
Lease, Fur ther , Tenant o&reou to pay n i l other chargea, coe t c , a*:-
ponoea, l i o n s , Witor r e n t s , rotcc cad l icense feao, including ba t 
not l imited to water, e l e c t r i c i t y , &ZQ, telephone,, cower, other 
u t i l i t i o a , e t c . , to the ond that rente s h a l l bo received by Landlord 
unabctcd by any catch chor^co. Tenant acreao to remit promptly to 
Landlord, copies of paid rccoipta with rcopoct to taxoc, and on 
•demand, rccoipto evidencing payasnt of a l l CDCCUflutsnta or othor 
public chcrueo co payable by "tenant• Al l ouch Waco on lend ca ly 
for tho f i r cc fcnd Ica t yo&ro of tho t e ru hereof c h s l l bo equi tab ly 
prorated between the p a r t i e s , tenant t o poy e l l tcscco on tiaprovcy/.^ntc • 
(b) Toncnt cha l l not be obi ica tod , hov;jvor, to pay r.\y<y 
income tc;*, prcf i to t ax , excise t o : or other tax or d u r ^ o tfcet tJiy 
bo payable by or chargeable to Lcndlerd under tiny p roc l^ t c!^Ci:'a:vo. 
Inw of tho United 0 to too or thu Ctuto in uhich tha deraioad p rof i t
 v-,. 
ore located, or lanesod by any p o l i t i c a l taking cubdivlcion t librae J 
or cny gevcrnniotctai r.goncy, upon cr u i t h recpact to tho r en t rcncivc.d 
by LctCvdlord under thic Lccco or upon tho r igh t of Landlord to rcccivr; 
ouch ronta or to do bualncco, 
(c) Tenant c h i l l not bo o b l i f t e d to pay c\ny ii\hiri(::;r/;^P 
Crer«/;f0r, c c t a t o , ouccoowion or other c fn i l a r kctz or clvirrp tlz-t i'-y 
* arid 30.?/' of ono th i rd oC any ovcrrido ren ta lo paid by other uubtnrmntr, or 3ft.?A 
of ono th i rd of ono ^orcont of a)\ nalco mado by othor occunants of dor.;icod 
promi3Cu wldclKiVor in ^routor (appliuu a lso to 22, (c) ( l ) ) 
ov MM- n i r v L"^ (- J <•».}.•!- ; ricsuuvi-ty £ar nny p a r t thr.v.'u), v.--. 
e o n t c s t v u , - .:.*., . . :i ,
 t]i^ r ^ ; | , i : t o pay 1.I12 8 ^ , ) , tOhot;i,: i : 
with cuvj par .,,
 (. l t VC;Vi- <:i^ amount s o ^ H u 
by r.rjndloL-o
 t J K J J ^ ;^ (Sj t_ u l t K : , ^ ^ ^ t o g e t h e r v.»ii;U 
in.tort
 v, , ; /; i t '„ , . v ;.'*,. ;.-- ennuia ilro.u the- dnl:* 1 o2 VJ;-.-*-i**"*,f 
i'ViCl 1*1 u I 
o:;t;enciina beyoiic .
 w , ;p i ra t J.on of tlvi fip.r.I i;ei:u oi; th in 
Locao ^ •~ 1 1 * - , . .-.;*• ,;Cit V.'ciV.n*. lino Landlord, 
*•>.' I ^'J. . ... o::pro.f;;jly cond i t i oned al;:»on: 
- ' rd \orci * ,.1»» < ~ '•.,;.,;iu!i.:n:i.C'.i y ! /cn^\ / 
(:(:yl*i.l j • . '.!:;-:,:.{.„( •; , 1,; • >(., „,,, C^KI.:--^ -u :.t,j,..LSf.G
 5 ecrfiliod 
t o d a : - .. CXOiCUCioi. , , . ; , „ • . .:
 7 , . : " . . . ' - rd ' . . .v :. ; . 
Po l i cy <^ \ ;,-n, :.. . ,
 K., ,,: , ,;.: XLL-C Anouvnnca Cor.v4vjnyft 
showing l:h.J L U . . !-- v' //.'cuirjes i,4... n:.i!uib^.vnd, 
rcarkoccblei n i t l a . . . . . . . . premises "vii t:cc; ol . . i , 
*...*- ./ ,* . ., ** LJ"?V cafiGicam . - . . iiccaoaiDry 
.* , . - a t^ J L.I •- to iil'ia dorainod prnn;j.G&n» 
. - ' ..*: • , ;riv , ' pj?e.iaitiC:o a re v a c a n t . 
- ..i ua J r.#.ct\, ..' „ the To lis lit m2y> fro.n 
u T; fur^a^i . - i.o; .1,1 hereof , :. : : . . . - , • 
• L\»; * v . expense 3 c o n s t r u c t upon .4.'.", or 
any p e r t .<: t'..- dcrciacd premises> new b u i l d i n g end itr.y.rev-• i ^ t j i n i u 
th.'i ^a l lo t t ing c o n d i t i o n s ; 
(o) /'ill improvenrjnta and now b u i l d i n g sha.i., • . • 
[r.oo<l :ir:d f.ubnfccntial. ch.v.i.r;c(:or t.,p,'\ r.wch >:\r, \ylll not i;.*nit; ::o d-'-' 
ti.iV v ^ l ; ^ ox i:ii'.: land li.atv.!>y dor.iirjcd. 
(b) TChat Tcnnnc o h s l i ;• : ^ . ^ . ^ . . . ^
 ; . 4 . .d end 
n .2 tc r ia lc furn ished i n or about tu.; cro.cti.on "..:* -->;v;r . i-u^r, o ' 
cu-h bui.l.din[,G i:nd ir.>provoTr,vnt«, and keen the dcmi«ccJ p*i.ct»;isc:i o;\d 
bu iWlv*^ ov/j Hvprovcir.cnti; tlv:vr-:on ::t a)J. tiruus i r c e and c l e a r oi: 
i\mu. ii.'jn'j xo-j Jabor or wK:i;ori...'J.u .Cuv/uii'dicd in and al»c\it r.ucli c r c c -
t i o / : fi:;d conDU-ucsr-iov^ :ind will. doCond; ai: i t a own c c c t and ^ui^jv.e , 







lor labor elaiucd to havo been so performed or mater ial clai.vic)
 C o 
have been no furnished, and promptly pay each and every judgmdu: .,.lUd0i 
or jyiven a^'in-Jt said preiiiccs, or any parr; thereof, or the Luildlu-.a 
and/or improvei^;u.a thereof, and/or against Landlord 07; Tenant* ou 
account of any ouch l ien and indemnify and .save harmless tho Laud-
lord, i t s uuccassorc a ad assigns, *"«"•* a l l and every e.iaim and Action 
on account of nuch claim, l ion or j a d v e n t •. Thau no const ruct ion 
ohnll be commenced without a completion and performance bond in th<* 
smount of tha estimated to t a l construction cost by a corporate p.urcty 
caving i-^3 Landlord ai\d the loaned prcwirca harmless from any and 
a l l claim:: oi? credi tors oi: any kind and suff ic ient to s a t i s fy tha 
cont rac tor ' s bead ins requirement of tha tttato of Utah, guarantee i»g 
timely performance to tha sa t i s fac t ion of Kros&o under an executed 
Exhibit "J?1 (Xan^nt-S. S# Kres^a Co, Lcate) , and saving Landlord 
harmless from loan re emit lug from non-performance of the Tenant 's 
construction obligations? under tha ICrcsge Lease. 
(c) All ouch conct7:uction and the completed buildings* 
(shall comply with a l l laws and ordinances r e l a t i n g thsvrcto. 
(d) Ho building sha l l be demolished or subs t an t i a l l y 
reduced in value during the f ina l five (3) years of tha Loaoe term 
or any renewal term, option for which has been exercised by Tenant, 
efcecpi; i f cams io destroyed by fi.ro or other casualty* Nothing in 
th is Paragraph d u l l abrogate &,L\y of tho recjuiramcats of Ar t i c le V 
and Ar t ic le 10 of th is Lease. 
(a) To finance the construct ion of nuch improvements i f 
and'when they may be constructed, tbo Tenant sha l l have the r i g h t to 
borrow mousy for jiuch purposes for both interim and end financing. 
The terms and conditions of nuch inortcace(s) chaJl be in the cole 
d iscre t ion of Tenant. Such loan(s) pay bo secured by Tenant asai^u-
ins to the m o r t i c e ( 0 ) Tenant16 i n t e r e s t in this Lease, 
(f) I t L\ further ;*ndcr;;tooc and agreed that Landlord 
wi l l subordinate i t s few t i t l e .or leasehold i n t e r e s t to construction 
iliort^a^o loan.'; ^nd/or ponaaricmt merr.f;a&cs upon 'the impruvcmcinti.' 
executed prior to tho co»»t\:cpnop.?ni: 0;: th is ICACO term, provided i t 
does not become personally l iab le for cuch liidubtedncss, that Ll:i« 
.„ «u):«i'y bond in ttnragraoli 6(b) above ie l a ui-jece, UK,*, 
f',.n h.v« a valid cuMna^e with Kreistys fiuWiMntitflly in £ lVl | | 
,.i- inh ib i t n))u , and that t i e Landlord ir, [\\von copier, o/f a l l 
KiicSi t r ansac t ion in advance o£ Hirnin?, and *y nllo«ed to parr. lci" 
waco in nupervir.ion of the d i s t r ibu t ion o£ the £und(; to aiuuvro p^y~ 
ir.ont fc'cr a l l iiaprovoinoritav and provided lu r ths r tha t upon miy fore* 
closure the Landlord way with the other Uniclowaur' whoco property 
cocurou the mortgage, cueceed to a l l r i g h t , t i t l e and internal: , hut 
no; obligationj of Tenant in the mortgaged prer.iicca. All ouch i«oj.'fc-
EPS© inafcrumsnta ehal l .gtv£ Landlord ths rijjbt uo be not i f ied by 
the rrtorfc&asce o£ any default by Tenant and tlw further rif#ht to 
cure any default which may exis t under tiny instrument connected 
with such iftortya^ loans. 
7. With ran pact: to any b u i l d i n g , Btructures or improve-
ments tit any tii»i3 constructed or erected by tenant on the de raised 
preraiGoc;, Tenant s h a l l ; 
(a) Have the r igh t , a t i t c own exponas, during the torn; 
hereof, to remodel, filter, add to or modify s t r uc tu r a l l y or' other-
wise, the b u i l d i n g end improvements s i tuated on tho dcaviacd 
preuiitiGf!; provided, however, that before cuch remodeling, a l t e r a t i o n , 
addi t ion or modification be made, the Tenant corapliea with a l l thcuc 
roquireiTiAntn eat iforth in Avtielc' 6 (a ) , (b) , ( c ) , ( d ) , ' ( « ) and (y) 
above and a l l other applicable provisions in uhio Lcasu enumerated. 
(b) At a l l tirnec during the term. oi! thic Lease maintain 
£iro and extended coverage incuawnce on a l l b u i l d i n g aucl improve-
ments erected end constructed upon the ciosAioocl premieer. in iir:urar.ca 
coiupanieo of generally recogniiscd respons ib i l i ty and c r e d i t , and 
authorised to do'business in tho State oil Utah, in the fu l l inuur-
ablo value there.oi: i\\ the event a m o r t i s e or other l i en cxiata OK 
said bui'idin^c or improvements, and in an amount o<jual to not lout; 
than 7071 of: \±?. l u l l insurabl* vclue vluui thovc ir. no l i en , with r. 
losu: payable clause nandnj; au beneficiaries bd:h vrausmt and Lavu31o::d 
ao the i r intcrcstfJ n.'ty appear. Ccrtilieace:; o£ r.lich pol ic ies oif 
insurance ohali be /;ive»i to landlord proi.^c'i.y upon jfocuancw. 7M 
tlitt event
 0t;; iMU o r <:-n,-^o by f i re or other i:ar*ualty, '/nnani: (JI..:1J. 
repair tuch dcuragrj and rv.\.(.ore the ]^i lnin; ; so da rned
 c o t-lUil. , ; ., 
PUUC it) iu.Ga £.ood condition ns' prior to ?;uah drmaj/j or dact:riu:t.;0o. 
All ciw.3 ariein; ; by re^or , of lo:;c under aald incinranee police:;, 
eh«Il be available to Vi:»v?nt lor the reconstruct ion or r e p a i r i n g . 
os the case r^y bo, of any building or buildings ih;;urcd or dor;-
troyed by f i re or other Uc mrcd rifiUUt Should any amount of cixh 
inf. lira nee proceeds re wain after completion end payment for the work 
pcrioruod, sruch amount, If Tenant be not in default under the torr.vj 
of t h i sL ' j a se , ahull be retained by and bo long t:o Tenant, 
(c) • Tenant afp:oa;j that a U - b u i l d i n g , s t ruc tures and 
improvementa 6 ha i l comply uUh a l l la\;s end ordinances r e l a t i n g 
there to . 
0, The doidaed promises may be used by Tenant for any 
lawful purpose, 
9, Tenant ehal l have the r ight to assign end t ransfer thia 
IQQCQ or any in te rcu t therein, and Tenant sha l l have the further 
r igh t to suble t , from time'to time, the domiced premise*; or any par t 
thereof; provided, however, that no flsoignsaftnL: s h a l l cons t i tu te a 
"novation", unless Tenant a hull assijyn ar.-3 t ransfer the Tenant* a 
i n t e r e s t in th is Lease on the following condit ions: 
(a) That any cuch astti^nco in a party hnviaj a bona 
fide not worth of not leso than One Million Vive Hundred Thousand 
($1,500,000,0:*)) froilara, and rhat cuch as/j;L<u:ou s h a l l as;r,u>,ta a l l 
obligations of Tenant hereunder nxid n^re'ea to be bound by thr> tirrms 
of th i s Lease, 
(b) That Tenant sha l l have completed and fu l ly p:\id for 
#11 the iijprofver,\enta required by i t s rubleace with ft. S. Kruc-go 
Company, eo;.ip-.;i«inii not luGfs than i; ixtyi :6ur .Vuousand (04,000) 
sc;urrc feet of building on this property and property ^ujneent . to 
the p?;oaiir.ea and a l l oiV'Sito improvements. 
(c) Tint S. S, Kre £0 Co.-.ipany lia« occupied the. buiidin:;;; 
under a nub lc^e fror.i Tenant wherein the herein described pre.::iiej 
are included a:, a nocuusary ana integcnl part of tha H. S, '/re!.;;/: 
Company leasehold for a torn of not le;;e than tuanty-f ivs OM :/••;;:..:,. 
10, Uith rorjpeet to any b u i l d i n g , .structure;] \.r .'.r..;-'••—'* 
monta constructed on tlu) uV.fliry.d proni.".C!J by T^nan':, •i'an'Mf: cw -•• 
.
 %JnVcoa tlii:K i t w i l l , nt i to own e>:p-j;uiu, dujria. u... Cl, 
....c» af this 1.00:30, keen such b u i l d i n g , s t ruc tures ami '..ifmrc•.•••.. 
f . . n t : ; in ceod r e p a i r , cue! at the expirat ion of the tor»t.3 or any 
Kt!jr.:wni o r extension thereof, yield end deliver up the. aa.au. in rV.v..; 
condition, reasonable wear and use thereof ami cJa.«U[#;a by the clep '-nu 
or other cause or casual ty not customarily insured against: by f i r e 
ond extended coverage insurance policy excepted. 
11. Tonr.nt agrees to indemnify Gad hold harmless the 
Landlord £roa any l i a b i l i t y for dar::ar(as to any person or property 
in , on, about or in connection with «aid demised proinifiec frou any 
cause vAia'cucover; and "o riant v:ill procure and keep in effect during 
the torsi hereof adequate personal injury and property don^ge l i a b i l i t y 
insurance in amounts of not loss than $200,000 for any oaa pardon* 
$500,000 for one accident or occurrence, and $50,000 property daj.v.trra, 
naming Landlord as an addi t ional insured and, s h a l l reasonably del iver 
copies or c e r t i f i c a t e s or rrujfuoranda of such insurance to Landlord. 
12. In the event that the es ta te created,hereby sha l l -bo 
taken in 'execut ion or by other process of lavj, or if Tenant sha l l bo 
adjudicated insolvent or bankrupt pursuant to the provisions or ony 
s t a t e or federal insolvency or bankruptcy ac t , or i f a receiver or 
t rus tee of the property of Tenant sha l l be appointed by reason of 
Tenant's insolvency or i nab i l i t y to pay i t s debts , or if cvny Mrjisn-
went sha l l he luadc u£ Tenant's property for the benefit or creditor;?, 
then a)\C in any of liucfi events, Landlord u.Cvy„ a t Landlord1 a option, 
terminate this Lea&e and a l l r ights of Tenant hereunder by ^.ivins 
to Tenant notice in wri t ing of the e lec t ion of Landlord to so 
terminate; provided, hov:cvor, if : 
(a) The order of court creat ing any of the d i s a b i l i t i e s 
enumerated in th i s Art ic le bo not f ina l by reason oil pendency of 
the proceeding or appeal from such order: or 
(b) Tenant ch::ll he. s/no a debtor seeking corporate or 
othsr reorj/nvlr.atioi'i under the tersr.y of Chapter/10 of the present 
r.ritioiwJ. Bankruptcy Act or any other s imilar bankruptcy ac t , or rn.y 
other sli.iilar provision:) of any p-iescnt or, future act.; tlwn Landlo/d 
r.hail not II^ IVO the ri[,ht to tort.\i.pete and cauvol \:hi.r. 'inu^.c by x'* '* •''-
of any oc the dlsriblj.-j tj,..., .r.uwera ted bers in , no lo;i- an T'?n*:r,«: 
to Landlord-all rtn'>unt::« jviyrtlnV by Tenant to Landlord hereup.^.v ^ 
ful l M« and when tin r.i:-v R'cor'jo duo and payable. 
(a) X .^CJ'O 1,,-/ taviu.toalwJ in# I?UV5U2IK:« hereof, Landlord 
reserves, n i l hia r i -hjn and r e a d i e s against Sonant to the sa,:j3 
extent as i f cuch T..o;u*o wore not torminat«.•('. 
13. Tt i:; hereby agreed that in thc-i event of Tenant herein 
holding over a f t e r ' t h e termination of thia L?afl«, thereoftor ' the 
tenancy nhall be from juonth'to month in the absence of a wr i t t en 
agreement to :uh& contrary, v::»tU the uanvj terra as herein otated ' 
applicable to the extant they <Hr« consis tent with •'* month to Month 
tenancy. 
Vu In. ths event default ohal l bo made by Tenant in tha 
payment of any aur.tfj duo hsroiuiJer upon the day they become duo and 
payabla and such default continues for a period of ten (10) daya 
a f t e r date of :i.ailing to Tormt of wr i t ten notice thereof, as per 
Paragraph 26 boreof, or i f default ohal l be icado or suffered by Ton:.;.:: 
in any of the other covenants and conditions of th is Leant* rfcejuirod 
to be kept or pfjrfornod by Tanant (other than payment of woncsy) and 
• Tenant f a i l s to cure such default or dcfuulta within Gi:;ty (60) day; 
a f te r walling to Tenant of wri t ten notice from landlord spoclfyin:; 
the default or defaults cow'plained of, than and in any such event 
or eventsj and whenever and as often at? euch fa i lure or defaul t shr.15 
occur, Landlord inay pursue any rorcsdiea allowed by law and il* rsh.?13. 
and ray be lawful for Land lord, a t Landlord* e e lec t ion , a t any tis.vj 
thereaf ter , to re -en te r in to and. ropoci.cso the provriocc and tbe 
b u i l d i n g s ) and improve .r.entci aitu&ted thereon, and every part th^rcc* . 
and Tenunt and each and every other :ccupant to remove and put ouC, 
In the 'event that Tenant's default (other than non-payment of ;:;oj;'V) 
U not cured within said s t a ty (GO) day period by reason of labor 
t roubles , war, governnftnt ret / / 'a tior.es, unava i lab i l i ty of iv.atevi.:. -•. 
or any condition beyond Tenant? reasonable cont ro l , tbo t i r e for 
curing ouch default sha l l be r.-tond^d accordingly. 
If/, If the whole or ir.oro than ten percent (10Z) oC t)v 
halldin^s to Lo lfuotod on th^ e m a n a t i o n of the leasee; p .w. , r ' ; 
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v j a l t oth*r adjoining propwty i u i t j a l l y leased to 5. S. IVrrojo 
: . u.,;;,y by T'.:r.ja!;, islictil bo {;;!a:n by nny public author i ty UJHJCV UP,,. 
,cn:or or c-wincMit <\}iain, the/: tho term of thin Lous'-' whall cr«.u:c ,v.i 
;hc purt so whan froi.i the day tho por.ricc&ion of that par t fthslj. 1,0 
required for any public purpose, arid the rent ehctll be* paid up t.o 
± a t day and iron; that day tho Tenant sha l l have" the r i ^h t to einbo-
:.oncel thia Lease and declare the aasne nul l and void or to continue 
In the poss;ccr.5.on of the remainder of the car.ie under tho fccrr.s herein 
provided, encept that the rent nbal l be reduced in proportion to 
the value of : the preroioacstaken, to the value of ' the regain in;?, pvo;.v 
iuQB, and tha t cuch r iyh t to cancel .or declare nul l and void siv:»U 
er.pirc uulo&c c»:;c?reii;cd by written, notice to Laudlord within cir.ty 
(60) dayo a f t e r the taking of possession for ,public purpoiie* 
If the \vholo or more thun ten per cent (107r) of the Idu'., 
cowprinliic the combination of the leased preruieeo and"al l other 
property i n i t i a l l y leased to 8. S. Ki-esjjc Company by Tenant> s h a l l 
be taken by any public authori ty wider the power of cirdnent domain 
without su i tab le replacement"for the part so taken, then the tovrm oC 
thic Lease, a t the option of 'fenrmt t h a l l cease on the part ao tab-;.* 
from the day the possession of that part sha l l ' be required for any 
public purpoaea, and the rent aha!! be paid up to that <i&y %snd from 
that dc\y the Tenant OTJUII have the r ight to c i ther cancel th is Lecu^ 
and decloro th? cair.c null an;] void or to continue in th:-? porjeeacic:; 
of the remainder of tho -casici under the tern;5 herein provided, c:ceo;V. 
that the rent cha l l be reduced in proportion to the value of t).v..» 
prewiceri taken to the value of the rersainins preiaiffeo. ^otwithr^'*', ••• 
ing anything
 fcoritained hereto to the contrary, nei ther party shel l 
have the r igh t to cancel this Lcasa, ualc.su S. 3, Krc-sgc Company cr 
itfi successor, aa 'p r inc ipa l sole Tenant in possession, e lec ts to 
tewninato because of yuch taking for public purpose, and Tenant ;•!"•'*• 
not be en t i t l ed to ony reduct i ' 1 of ren ta l unless Krosge's rcnt«*:i 
is pruport iunj tely reduced. 
If ench taking rh.t l l occur prj.or t o tho tir:,c Tenant \u • 
oructod or construe red U'II; ).^i)ilcl;.n^(^) or atructur^r;) upon the d •'«'•' 
pre^hjcb^ thca w)J. <h/i.v,|>\'.; awarded rhcrefor sha l l bclonr;, to a;:d \ •' 
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the property of tiw LcudJmrd, whether such da-nages s h a l l he aw.rdod 
as compensation for d-ininution in value to the leasehold or to the 
fee of; the. prcnlser. herein leased; provided, h o o v e r , tha t l\ v Lond~ 
lord s h a l l not re en t i t l ed to any port ion of tl\c award IUVJS to T^.r/jt 
for loso* of business . If such taking occurs a f t e r Tenant his erected 
or constructed on the caiaiaod premises nr.y build i n s (c) or s t r u c t u r e ^ 
then out of any damages awarded for such raking the Landlord d u l l 
pay to the Tenant a sum agreed to by the p a r t i e s , or a f a i r and ju re 
por t ion thereof, as provided by law in determination of tha Tenant's 
i n t e r e s t in tiy?. condemnation award. 
16. nothing in tJil.fi Lease contained s h a l l be construed cw, 
l imi t ing the r igh ts of Tenant to mortgage i t s i n t e r e s t in the .deivdccd 
premises r.nd in the bui ld ing(s) a t any tirae t h e r e o n , i t being under-
stood tha t the Tenant ir-ay wort gags i t s e s t a t e or i n t e r e s t to secure 
a bona f ide loan or loans of money then rcado or about to be uujde to 
the Tenant, or .to extend or renew the same, provided, however, that 
no mortgagee nor anyone \)ho clfliais by, through or under such mortgage 
s h a l l by v i r t u e of such mortgage enjoy nny g rea ter or more extended 
r i g h t s than the Tenant has under this Lcaaejand provided, fur ther , 
t h a t any such mortgage and the r ights and i n t e r e s t s of the mortgagee 
and of all persons claiming by, through or under such mortgage, aha.ll 
be in every respect subject and subordinate to a l l the condi t ions , 
p r iv i l eges and covenants c.f this Lease ar.:! the r i g h t s , powers r.nd 
p r iv i l eges of the Landlord here in , including the p r i o r i t y of i n t e r e s t 
of Landlord to s l i par t ies except the f i rs t 'mortgagee for inprove-
merits, i f any there be, executed pursuant to Paragraph C hereinabove. 
17. Upon the termination of th is Lease, whether by lapse 
of time or /otherwise, a l l buildings and improve:iants then and at such 
time upon said demised precises sha l l belong to Landlord. 
I S . Tenant s h a l l , a t i t s ow expense, under penalty of 
fo r f e i tu re and damages, prompt'/.y comply with a l l lav?ful la^jc, orders, 
regula t ions or ordinances of a l l municipal, county and s t a t e author-
i t i e s a f fec t ing the premises hereby leased', and the c l ean l iness , 
sa fe ty , occupation anu use of the sa»,:e. 
19. In the event that Landlord s h a l l , during the period 
covered by th i s Lear.o, obtain pejecction of caid premises by rc-r.ntry 
/;u.'...v.try ;ii:ouccCLr\i/: > o r o.u:,«i.-jJL-:\:; Xeuaut aorcivy tftfco.u** ;.o ;>..y \tt ». 
lord the expense incurred in 'obtaining postffcSttion o'c r.ald ;.n'ci.-(.».:^ .v 
ttii.;l oUo .*J 11 L'^ ;i.:r*Mii*. and co.u.'a.Uwsiuu;; uhich luay bo paid in cv.d ei.ou;: 
the l e t t i ng of zi\ct iuu?;«. 
20* I t is agreed thet oaeh and every of the l i^h t i i , rc;-,/> 
dies and benuiittf provided by tl.iii» Loa^c .'iholl be cumulative and ybali 
uoj be exclusive? ox any other of /•aid r i ^h t a , ro/aedica and benefits*, 
or oi any otheir r ly l i tc , rciiusdico and benefits allowed by low. 
21, One or wore waivorc, of any covenant or condition by 
Landlord sha l l not be -cons trued aa a waiver of a further breach of th . 
con/3 covenant or condition. 
22. Tenant sha l l have the following options to csiteud the 
term of this L?.a«cs, if a t the tlu;a or axe re ice- of the option the 
Xcnanfc is not in oofault hereunder; 
(<0 An oprion to extend tho toiin for an addit ion::! period 
of live. (%j) years frera and offer the expirat ion of the i n i t i a l , ioc.eo 
term, 
(b) If such option "ia exorcised, Tenant sha l l have five 
(S) addit ion*!, cuceer.ijive options to renew this U-auej, each for a 
'turui of five (5) years tine each option is conditioned upon the excr-
ete a of the renewal option i;:»r-odlately preceding. 
(c) All of the options heroin granted chal l be exercised 
by notice in wri'izing to Landlord jjivca not la te r then one htuurad 
and f i f ty (150) ilsys prior to the expiration of the thsn-orJ.stin:.; 
lease term, and in the i.&nuor hereinafter provided. 
Ail of the ttvruid end 'conditions of this Lease, sha l l r ^ ^ i n 
in l u l l force and of feet during any renewal term (a) except that t!v.» 
annual ren ta l -provided ior herein .'shell be adjusted as of the 
co^.encouent dftto of any extended tt-r.iii as follows? 
(.1) At and for en annual juiiiiwu^ r en ta l as ro t 
forth hereafter for each ^ptiou period, plu;> 61.CX of o.ve-
tlvird (1/2) of .my addition-:*! or ovcr-ric-o rentals, paid to 
the Tenant under the previa iua-, of the nKre?;^e LenGo", 
(2) (1) !!V?nLy v;*uH::;and Four Hundred Uollare 
f/^r (020,400,00) per year for the C.!J;B*.; five-yi-.ar option c.;<:,»?•• 
/ V •>• • 
aion period bcrpArai::;* on tir.j , . , / j ^ day of ^^miLLSC^^ • ••Zft-
*// 
,md civlina on r.V* J ? / _ ,Uly ,v, 0 j ^ / / „ _ , ^Z^OO'l 
(11) 'JV'.Miry-'lT.io Thou:\'W;d Four iluiu^rofl 'rorty 
Vtolinrr. (£2V.'-r>.0O) -c>r yew for the- cc.-ocr.-.i* fivc-yor.r 
y / option orccsnaion voric/» bc^inrrln,;; on trliv / - ; ^ day of 
]9-iLfrt*j>Jl^i ?APJ> -*- c-nc'inj; on the ,? / . ;£ <lny o£ 
3uLLs{ > &Q£<T 
( i i i ) Twrity-?om: TV,u:\'Kid Sir. Hundred E i g h t y 
Four Dollars ($!7'.,('*':,00) pc-v vc-o.v for the third fivc-y>oJ: 
/
 tfv option e.xfconcion psrio-l boj'Jnuirr', on thft .„.JL™ r'°y ry* 
J >Jlj&yC±i.lZ.> 2 % ? £!!>* °^t5/:- on the J ? / _ ^y of 
(iv) Twavi!;y-.SC:v:sn TJuvjsfnad One Hundred F i f ty Two 
^ anc! 40/100 Hollars (027,152.*0) jv.r,: y*or Tor the fourth 
.five-yo:ar op!:icn or; ton* ion period bo^inrJnf. on tlv« JJzZL ()^lT 
° - ^Jkij-hi-ZIi 2A/3> <1r},v1 ^W'ivuj cm tho _ J _ L day of 
. (v) Tvnnty-iiitvv Thousand Eijjht Hundred 8i:a:y~Savfca 
and 64/100 Hollars ($?.?,S67.G';) per yonr for tho i 'ifth 
i ? l £ivu-yei»r option extension pnriocK bc^irminft on th* j^J^L. 
day o£ /Vvi^u-.^ ^" , SLOjfjr; and ending on tl»e J ? J L _ day oi! 
^ (vi) Thirty-Two Thousand Eight Hundred Pif;ty-i'c«rr 
«nd /.0/100 Dollars ($32,r,SA,40) sor yc,*<r for the sJ.Mth 
, S A 
fivv'i-ycar option *o:;fonf»ion period, beginning on tho / ^T 
a • ' 
t,aV °^
 r/9;LA)-<-y /T» ^ . . ^ r,/|-' Gw'i'tfJ o n the ^JJV.^ O&y O':'J 
?3* Landlord a^rcca, to orient:) fit ar.y t in* nr.d fron 
t ino to t i r o , 'ouch o^roer.vcmtr. br;tv;oon ViviOifird bora trader a:; Ojrirjx 
Tenant hereunder, an Landlord> and.any or a l l oS Tenant's cubt^v.A 
covering portions or a l l of tho defined ^ r c n i c ^ , by vhich oj.v?:s-
r.K:nt(<;) thv. L-ndlor.-; (Own.-;::) • i l l n^:*:* tbnt in th'2 cvrrd; of l.:h-. 
tctrrrdncrtiori for :i.ny re*?, son v;b..-i:Gonvor or tb:!.« L**.'<«:>, i£ t';^ •vjh-
J.csii'Cft :I.G not tb.cn in c'ef/rjlt: of i t s iv^bVMtta: 
(n) SucVi sv.V;Miv*rit(!s) w\y r.cwr.in io po:::^f^»icn ::o lcv%..\ 
C:R a l l tb/j obliyitio:-..:) ovlnj to l.r.tWIo::-.1 by Von^n*, wwon tb:•.:'» C-v-
j,< .:;<•«: rn.^.iu scuisfiod;, Mid fcueh f,uh;:.ouant(:0 fchall a;::;«..
 n l t 
.j~y 0.1.1 CIUD3 CJUC I J u d e r f h i l . GVOlUlJ 1,3 a U : t O S u c h L S i ' l d l o t O ; , ; , {. 
(b) V'ua;; Landloru wi l l notify in wri t ing the J.UV.LC •,.:.:•-,•• 
of any deiaulf by Tenant and ollou hubteunat t h i r t y (SO) ^ciy;. i\iv.A 
tho date of such notice within \mic.h to euro tuich defaul t . 
24. Tenant agro'ju to pursue reasonable conduct to pre-
vent: adverse par t ies iron, gaining prescr ipt ive r ights and car VJ».K«U<::; 
over the loused premises, 
2 5 / This Loci no sha l l bo interpreted in accordance \;ith 
the la\:s of tho Soitc of Utah, 
26. All norices provided for in this Lease s h a l l be se::it: 
To Landlordj 
To Tommt: 
u4 South Main 
RoiT«t:i£«l, Utah, 04010 
3431 ViOiit Alabama St ree t 
Houston, Texas, 77000 
and/or such ouher place or placed at-, hereafter sha l l be designated 
in wri t ing by the reripoctive part ies* Guch notice sha l l bo ra i l ed 
U.S. Registered or Certified mail, re turn receipt requested, po<:ta;;o 
prepaid. 
27* Landlord covenants that Tenant, on payment of a l l the 
aforesaid insralliaents and performing a l l Che covenants aforesaid, 
sha l l and may peacefully and'quiet ly have, hold and .enjoy thr; said 
cJcxni«cd premises for the'term aforesaid," 
2G. landlord and Xaviaat agree to execute, au uhe tiv.;s of 
execution of this Lease or upon request by e i ther party, a short .tvrri.i 
lease for recording purposes, as trains forth tho legal descript ion of 
the property, the term of this Le^cc: and reference* to the option to / 
renevj the Le^se, 
29. The covenants, conditions and agreement;-, of this 
Lease shrill bo binding upon and sha l l inure to the benef i t of ,i:bo 
he i r s , representa t ives , successor,'; and assigns of tho par t ies h;r/L*o» 
XM WX'f*:^ ^ WifJ)U3i0j', l:ht- urt::Lt:.s hereto have cause« -;:h;:se p:c\'«u.'.s 
to be cwvoouued a l l ui! of the cay and year f i r s t ahov«? wri t ten , 
ftSCiftXT? nvr;v/j»r?::iv: ccvir:\i!Y, a c & v) u^:<'.v:i/>a ;>:;:;u;iyy::7, «. 
Utah Corporation Liv.L&frt irarfaorshiip ., 
I J'iV-si-.huu: /» Cn:/;r.;;. /'•;••: i.v.vr 
/v'in;»i.oru , , . . ton:rat 
• i.'rr Or V'£Ml, I 
, l
" : TA). 
r.jj.\rt 07 ISAVIG. : 
r.eicrc 13a 1221T21 L. ST/WIL ,^ who l.oj.r/^ r.y r.<J daly tfu-Oj-'n r.JU'. .•>:;• 
tivit he is yrsjicurifc of Security Xnvi.uifciw::nfc CO^NUV/, and i.;,^
 t;i%. 
within tirid la-re^oin^ ir^t/ru^'jal; y^s si£,i.i:d iv; bc>.al£ u.\ uai.»5 
Corporation by author i ty oZ a resolut ion o£ i t s Boaicd of a i / . . -^ .^ . . 
and said Keith L. Stable duly ackoov/lcc^d Co i&o that oaW Cor ; ,op-
t ion executed the fla.uc a no tha t ' t he seal affixed ic tli«s asa l o.L: 
ooid Corporation. 
A^'l$*M.t!&*^,tt1v^ 
n e s : Bountiful, Utah 
Cusu. E::p: Karen. l> 1972 
• • Kotwy- Public . . 
caiwrir oi? KARRIS., 
On thio £ g ^ d^y of \ , 9 ^ ^ , 197.^porsoiTtt).y 
X&VV****\J5^ r~ k^v;rt uo bo a general pmrtiwi-
of C & K ^ u h a t t a n AotsooiatOB, a Limited Partnarshlp, who oxoou;:ad 
tha within instrument and acknowledged that to executed the cams xo^ 
and on behalf of C & W Manhattan Acniociafcos as a general pa r tne r . 
Co;n, Exp^ jU^"> / /%& 
17) 
— l ! i ~ -
PROPERTY DESCRIPTION 
Beginning 3.14 chains South and C70.G4 feet East and 3.42 rods 
north and East 04.7 feet from Northeast corner of Southwest Quarter of 
Section 3G, Township 2 Horth, Range 1
 W c s i , Salt Lake Meridian; thence 
Southwesterly 401.1 feet along arc of TOO' curve to le f t (Note: tang to 
sd curve at its pt of beg. hairs South 20°5V West); thence East 837.54 
feet; thence North 6.915 chains; thence West 605.3 feet to beginning. 
EXHIBIT "A" 
\ 
\ . ; 
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•operty : K-MART/UOOOS CROSS/ 86 #3085 
WINDING BROOK CORP 















5,416.69.: BALANi ANCE FOR OCTOBER DUE $9,666.64. 




)perty : K-MART/WOO0S CROSS/ 86 #3085 
WINDING BROOK CORP 
Unit Detail Report 
2:27 pra 
Page: 4 
it Ref No. : 
it Number : 




ail Size : 








Company Name : 
Address : 
Address 
Monthly Base Rent 
Building/Dept. No. : 
Type of Heat 
Utilities Info. 











(1) TENANT PAYS PERCENTAGE RATE OF U OF SLAES IN EXCESS OF 8,250,000 
UP TO 12,375,000 AND 1/2X IN EXCESS OF 12,375,000 UP TO 16,500.00. 
TENANT MAY OFFSET ANY AMOUNTS PAID FOR REAL ESTATE TAXES IN EXCESS OF 
28,160. 
(2) LANDLORD SHALL PROVIDE MAINTENANCE INCLUDING 
CLEANING/SWEEPING,SNOW REMOVAL/SANDING AND LOT LIGHTS/ELECTRICITY. 
(3) LANDLORD SHALL PROVIDE BUILDING,LIABILITY AND RENTAL INSURANCE. 
(4) TENANT HAS A TOTAL OF FIVE(5>- FIVE(5) YEAR OPTIONS 8 SAME TERMS 
AND CONDITIONS, LEASE REQUIRES 180 DAYS PRIOR WRITTEN NOTICE TO 
LANDLORD. 
(5)TENANT RESPONSIBLE FOR REAL ESTATE TAXES.(SEE NOTE) 
(6) GROUND LESSORS ARE ENTITLED TO THE FOLLOWING: 
A. SECURITY INVESTMENT COMPANY (K-*1W) (Po^ H-+) 
C/O KEITH L. STAHLE OVERAGE X 1/3 X 61.8% ? # 2 > % 
84 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
BOUNTIFUL, UTAH 84010 
B. WILLIAM K. -AMP BARBARA Lr-OLSON Tn«*jl*>e«+ Co. 
420 &kc W. -2301 SOUTH MAIN STRCET OVERAGE X 1/3 X 38.2% 
BOUNTIFUL, UTAH 84010 (801) 295-3421 
SALES SUMMARY AND CHECK IF ANY, SHOULD GO TO TENANT BY FEBRUARY 1. 
NOTE: THE BILL FOR THE R.E. TAXES ON THE STAHLE'S PROPERTY(LG) GOES TO 
KMART WHICH IS PAID BY KMART. THE BILL FOR THE OLSON'S PROPERTY GOES 
TO OLSON WHICH IS THEN FORWARDED TO WINDING BROOK OFFICE. U.S. REALTY 
86 PAYS AND BILLS KMART. $ci-'-W In«*f*. CM. 
(7) ANNUAL GROUND LEASE PAYMENTS DUE 8/1 (STAHLE: $17,000.00 OLSON: 
$10,500.00). ftf» Wal-f XoJ.n 
(8) PERCENTAGE RENT DUE ON PIZZA HUT. 
TENANT PAID $111,000.00 FOR PAVING OF PARKING LOT; 
CREDIT TOWARDS, THE FOLLOWING MONTHS: 
MARCH 15,083.33 
APRIL 15,083.33 
O) > O 
p^\ *l 
- 1 / 3 
/ P v /•) u<; f/jy - 7/23 
U S R 004PQ 
886, 0T1-GI, K-MART #3085 
Div.Code: 886 
DivName: US Realty 86 Assoc. 
Dnit#: UT1-01 
Lessee: K-MART #3085 
TradingAs: UTAH, WOODS CROSS 
Sq.Ftg.: 84,000 
Contact: 
Phone#: 801 292-7276 
StartDate: 11/1/73 
Term: 25 yrs. 
EndDate: 11/30/98 





>>1%; 12,375,000-16.5 mill. >>0.5% 













LocatedAt: 610 W.2600 SOUTH, WOODS 






LenderName: WASHINGTON NAT'L INS 
LoanAmt.: 716,740.70 
Int.Rate: 0.00% 
22 of 49 
Management Report June 1995, Rick 
Forte. 
The following is a financial and 
operational summary for the six 
months ended June 30, 1995: 
Woods Cross - Kmart paid rent f or 
the months of January and 
February totaling $30,166.66. 
Kmart offset the rent for March 
through June totaling $60,333.32 
coded to parking lot repairs for 
work they performed several years 
ago. In July they resumed paying 
the monthly rent of $15,083.33. 
Percentage rents were received 
from Pizza Hut $17,989.00 and 
Kmart in the amount of $33,896.00. 
Legal fees were paid to 
Feinstein, Raiss totaling $3,000. 
Real Estate Taxes for the Davis 
County parcel were paid totaling 
$6,388.55. Ground lessors were 
paid their proportionate share of 
overages totaling $4,316.00 and 
$6,982.00. Additional lease 
commissions were paid to Roebling 
Management totaling $4,181.55 and 
$15,000.00 to Pentad Properties. 
Rent income for the six months 
ended June 30 1995 consists of 
rent receipts from Kmart totaling 
$90,499.98, Pizza Hut $6,300.00 
and MacFrugalls totaling 
$38,819.02. MacFrugals rent offset 
ended in May. Miscellaneous 
expenses include work performed by 
Triad Environmental totaling 
$5,000.00 in January and February 
for work performed in conjunction 
with the opening of MacFrugals. 
DueDate: Dec-uu 
SecondLender: WASHINGTON NAT'L INS 
Bal.Amt.: 337,036.80 
(1) TENANT PAYS PERCENTAGE RATE OF 
1% OF SALES IN EXCESS OF 
8,250,000 UP TO 12,375,000 AND 
1/2% IN EXCESS OF 12,375,000 UP TO 
16,500.00. TENANT MAY OFFSET ANY 
AMOUNTS PAID FOR REAL ESTATE TAXES 
IN EXCESS OF 28,160. 
(2) LANDLORD SHALL PROVIDE 
MAINTENANCE INCLUDING CLEANING 
/SWEEPING, SNOW REMOVAL/SANDING 
AND LOT LIGHTS/ELECTRICITY. 
(3) LANDLORD SHALL PROVIDE 
BUILDING, LIABILITY AND RENTAL 
INSURANCE. 
(4) TENANT HAS A TOTAL OF FIVE(5)-
FIVE(5) YEAR OPTIONS g SAME TERMS 
AND CONDITIONS. LEASE REQUIRES
 f 
180 DAYS PRIOR WRITTEN NOTICE TO.: 
LANDLORD. ~ } 
(5) TENANT RESPONSIBLE FOR REAL 
ESTATE TAXES. (SEE NOTE) 
(6) GROUND LESSORS ARE ENTITLED TO 
THE FOLLOWING; 
A. SECURITY INVESTMENT COMPANY 
C/O KEITH L. STAHLE, 64 SOUTH 
MAIN STREET, BOUNTIFUL, UTAH 
84010. >>>OVERAGE X 1/3 X 61.8% 
B. WILLIAM K. AND BARBARA L. 
OLSON 
2301 SWIM MAIN STREET, 
BOUNTIFUL, UTAH 84010 (801) 
295-3421 
>>>OVERAGE X 1/3 X 38.2% 
SALES SUMMARY AND CHECK IF ANY, 
SHOULD GO TO TENANT BY FEBRUARY 1. 
NOTE: THE BILL FOR THE R.E. TAXES 
ON THE STAHLE'S PROPERTY(LG) GOES 
TO KMART WHICH IS PAID BY KMART. 
THE BILL FOR THE OLSON'S PROPERTY 
GOES TO OLSON WHICH IS THEN 
FORWARDED TO WINDING BROOK OFFICE. 
U.S. REALTY 86 PAYS AND BILLS 
KMART. 
(7) ANNUAL GROUND LEASE PAYMENTS 
DUE 8/1 (STAHLE; $17,000.00 OLSON; 
$10,500.00). 
(8) PERCENTAGE RENT DUE ON PIZZA 
HUT. TENANT PAID $111.000.00 FOR 
PAVING OF PARKING LOT; CREDIT 
TOWARDS, THE FOLLOWING MONTHS; 
MARCH 15,083.33; APRIL 15,083.33; 
MAY 15,083.33; JUNE 15,083.33; 
JULY 15,083.33; AUGUST 15,083.33; 
SEPTEMBER 15,083.33; OCTOBER 




Property : K-WRT/HOGDS CROSS/ 66 #3085 





Name and Address 
K-MftRT *5t>85 
SHOPPIN6 CENTER 
W30DS CROSS, UT 84010 
PIZZA HIT 
610 W. dSOO SOUTH 
WOODS CROSS, UT 64010 
PNS STORES 'WftC FRILL'S) 
610 WEST 2600 SOUTH 
MOOTS CROSS, UT 
wI\DL\5 rFCOK IQR£ 
Detailed Rer.t Roll Report 









— Transacti:n= in Selected Range 
Amount description 
SO^ 333.3e 60r3:3.-s2 
0.00 1,050.00 
0.00 11,665.28 12,495.28 
15,083.33 Monthly Pent 
(15,063.33; Pymt. Bat en 595 Check 91435<T 
1,050.00 Monthly Rent 
6.633.75 Monthly Rer.t 
(7,243.75) *ynt. Batch 595 Cheer 03152056 
1,220.00 Coawon Area Maintenance 
\/ A C ft N T 
usRnrvun 
Iteer: RICK Detailed Rent Ro/i Report Pace: 
'Property : K-mftRT/WOODS CROSS/ 6b #3085 Fecort Date rro« : 5/GS/35 To : 9/30/35 
162 N.WOODS CROSS, UTAH 8*010 
Unit Occupant Deposits Previous Current Transactions i*« Selected Rcr.re 
Ref. Nup&er Name arid Address Held Ealance Balance Hmoant Description 
P P 0 P E R T Y T 0 T A L 
RNT fontnly Rent ££'.767.08 
CAM Coawon Area Maintenance 1,220.00 







Open Credits Refunded 
23,987.08 







Accounts Receivable Balance 73,878,60 
Security Deposits Held 0.00 
886, UT1-01, K-MART #3085 
Div .Code : 886 
DivNarue: US R e a l t y 86 Assoc . 
U n i t * : UT1-01 
Lessee: K-MART #3085 
TradingAs: UTAH, WOODS CROSS 
Sq.Ftg.: 84,000 
Contact: 
Phone#: 801 292-7276 
StartDate: 11/1/73 
Terra: 25 yrs. 
EndDate: 11/30/98 





>>1%; 12,375,000-16.5 mill. >>0.5% 













LocatedAt: 610 W.2600 SOUTH, WOODS 






LenderName: WASHINGTON NAT'L INS 
LoanAmt.: 716,740.70 
Int.Rate: 0,00% 
22 of 49 
Management Report June 19 95, Rick 
Forte. 
The following is a financial and 
operational summary for the six 
months ended June 30, 1995: 
Woods Cross - Kmart paid rent f or 
the months of January and 
February totaling $30,166.66. 
Kmart offset the rent for March 
through June totaling $60,333.32 
coded to parking lot repairs for 
work they performed several years 
ago. In July they resumed paying 
the monthly rent of $15,083.33. 
Percentage rents were received 
from Pizza Hut $17,9 89.00 and 
Kmart in the amount of $33,896.00. 
Legal fees were paid to 
Feinstein, Raiss totaling $3,000. 
Real Estate Taxes for the Davis 
County parcel were paid totaling 
$6,388.55. Ground lessors were 
paid their proportionate share of 
overages totaling $4,316.00 and 
$6,982.00. Additional lease 
commissions were paid to Roebling 
Management totaling $4,181.55 and 
$15,000.00 to Pentad Properties. 
Rent income for the six ^ jnths 
ended June 30 1995 consists of 
rent receipts from Kmart totaling 
$90,499.98, Pizza Hut $6,300.00 
and MacFrugalls totaling 
$38,819.02. MacFrugals rent offset 
ended in May. Miscellaneous 
expenses include work performed by 
Triad Environmental totaling 
$5,000.00 in January and February 
for work performed in conjunction 
with the opening of MacFrugals. 
USR 004.? 1 
DueDate: Dec-00 
SecondLender: WASHINGTON NAT'L INS 
Bal.Amt.: 337,036.80 
(1) TENANT PAYS PERCENTAGE RATE OF 
1% OF SALES IN EXCESS OF 
8,250,000 UP TO 12,375,000 AND 
1/2% IN EXCESS OF 12,375,000 UP TO 
16,500.00. TENANT MAY OFFSET ANY 
AMOUNTS PAID FOR REAL ESTATE TAXES 
IN EXCESS OF 28,160. 
(2) LANDLORD SHALL PROVIDE 
MAINTENANCE INCLUDING CLEANING 
/SWEEPING, SNOW REMOVAL/SANDING 
AND LOT LIGHTS/ELECTRICITY. 
(3) LANDLORD SHALL PROVIDE 
BUILDING, LIABILITY AND RENTAL 
INSURANCE. 
(4) TENANT HAS A TOTAL OF FIVE(5)-
FIVE(5) YEAR OPTIONS § SAME TERMS 
AND CONDITIONS. LEASE REQUIRES 
180 DAYS PRIOR WRITTEN NOTICE TO 
LANDLORD. 
(5) TENANT RESPONSIBLE FOR REAL 
ESTATE TAXES. (SEE NOTE) 
(6) GROUND LESSORS ARE ENTITLED TO 
THE FOLLOWING: 
A. SECURITY INVESTMENT COMPANY 
C/O KEITH L. STAHLE, 64 SOUTH 
MAIN STREET, BOUNTIFUL, UTAH 
84010. >>>OVERAGE X 1/3 X 61.8% 
B. WILLIAM K. AND BARBARA L. 
OLSON 
2301 SWIM MAIN STREET, 
BOUNTIFUL, UTAH 84010 (801) 
295-3421 
>>>OVERAGE X 1/3 X 38.2% 
SALES SUMMARY AND CHECK IF ANY, 
SHOULD GO TO TENANT BY FEBRUARY 1. 
NOTE: THE BILL FOR THE R.E. TAXES 
ON THE STAHLE'S PROPERTY(LG) GOES 
TO KMART WHICH IS PAID BY KMART. 
THE BILL FOR THE OLSON'S PROPERTY 
GOES TO OLSON WHICH IS THEN 
FORWARDED TO WINDING BROOK OFFICE. 
U.S. REALTY 86 PAYS AND BILLS 
KMART. 
(7) ANNUAL GROUND LEASE PAYMENTS 
DUE 8/1 (STAHLE: $17,000.00 OLSON:" 
$10,500.00). 
(8) PERCENTAGE RENT DUE ON PIZZA 
HUT. TENANT PAID $111.000.00 FOR 
PAVING OF PARKING LOT; CREDIT 
TOWARDS, THE FOLLOWING MONTHS: 
MARCH 15,083.33; APRIL 15,083.33; 
MAY 15,083.33; JUNE~ 15, 083 .33; 
JULY 15,083.33; AUGUST 15,083.33; 
SEPTEMBER 15,083.33; OCTOBER 
5,416.69. BALANCE FOR OCTOBER DUE 
_________ 
USR 00433 
886, UT1-02, PIZZA HUT 23 of 49 
Div.Code: 886 
DivName: US Realty 86 Assoc. 
Unit#: UT1-02 
Lessee: PIZZA HUT 





Term: 20 yrs. 
EndDate: 7/9/94 




%Rent: Difference betw, annual 









Addressl: 9111 E.DOUGLAS 




LocatedAt: 610 W.2600 SOUTH, WOODS 











Bal .Amt . : 
USR 00435 
886, UT1-03, PNS STORES (MAC FRUGAL'S) 24 of 49 
Div.Code: 886 
DivName: US Realty 86 Assoc. 
Unit*: UT1-03 
Lessee: PNS STORES (MAC FRUGAL*S) 
TradingAs: UTAH, WOODS CROSS 
Sq.Ftg.: 
Contact: \) T~ ^ ' <^ 
11 
Phone*: 
















Addressl: 612 W.2600 SOUTH 
Address2: 
City: N.WOODS CROSS 
State: UT 













X t-o I 
LEASE ABSTRACT 
SHOPPING CENTER/CORP. NAME US fa /f/ f 6 
NAME OF LESSEE f(-(1«r+ =#36gJ 
TRADING AS 
ADDRESS 
3100 U/ f.* ffe* tfd. 
Tr*y( f1>\ WOfj 
SQ. FT Wtvya- few— fj t>oo 
LEASE COMMENCEMENT tlfihl - /'fa/if 
LEASE TERMS: 2S ycf, 
RENEWAL S Cyr pkh'tnr 
RENT INITIAL TERM: KfiM IS/"* 
RENT ESCALATION INITIAL TERM^ 
RENT DURING RENEWAL TERMS: 
PERCENTAGE RENT: $<\\tj \ 92fo(<>*o- ;2 j7 / ,40o / % 
CAM INITIAL TERM: 
CAM RENEWAL TERMS: 
TAX INITIAL TERM: ff*Hlt 5 fy^/- ^ 1°^ 1° /( ^ i Ity /*/ ^ 
TAX DURING RENEWAL TERMS: Olttn f/«Wfi/- b,l\ yes h QheQ ^or^rJel jo i/S; W€ b / / I / / | fl rr 
UTILITIES: 
INSURANCE: 
LATE RENT PAY'T FEE: U ' ' ' !/j 
.*.'*. ^ w i f / / T " 
RENT SECURITY DEPOSOT: „ / \ rJL it / 
• 0 2-
LEASE ABSTRACT 
SHOPPING CENTER/CORP. NAME US fal-fy 2(> 




°l\l\ E, AonAj P.O. &* VZS 
Wic^.U . Ks. b72.ol 
SQ. FT Ujtrfo' K'Q 
LEASE COMMENCEMENT ijlojlH- 7/l/l V 
LE^SE TERMS: Zo yes. V-
RENEWAL 1 Syrt offrorts 
RENT INITIAL TERM: JoSb- /rto. 
RENT ESCALATION INITIAL TERM: 
RENT DURING RENEWAL TERMS: ioSo 
-}«*>, 
PERCENTAGE RENT: Difference 
, 
CAM INITIAL TERM: 
CAM RENEWAL TERMS: 
TAX INITIAL TERM: 








LATE RENT PAY'T FEE: 
RENT SECURITY DEPOSOT: 
VTl-oi 
LEASE ABSTRACT 
SHOPPING CENTER/CORP. NAME US /<*•»/f V < ^ NAME TRADING AS 
ADDRESS 
OF LESSEE 
243b £*W~ Qel fima / /W, 
Pom\n*}tjrZjC<>/. 10 2 20- (>Jo& 
SQ. FT I?ZOO 
LEASE COMMENCEMENT T/? A*/ - T / W ^ 
LEASE TERMS: <? yrf, 
RENEWAL ' f fyr. obihns 
RENT INITIAL TERM: "jrs i-s U33v/*o*. Yrr. £-? ?ft ?.«/»#. 
RENT ESCALATION INITIAL TERM: 
RENT DURING RENEWAL TERMS: 1*1-oj>hj/i j 2 1% lj Jmo ZJMt'/l IQ.VoQ.Ufmo, 
PERCENTAGE RENT: 
I . M||(y,^fLfe.H / *»~r >C >**»Al. - ^ & _ /y^ fc*^  
CAM INITIAL TERM; J&ie-litoi A^^UeJ, ^ J M & ^ r 
CAM RENEWAL TERMS: 
TAX INITIAL TERM: M ^" c , £• i/ v»W«r// 
TAX DURING RENEWAL TERMS^ 
UTILITIES: 
INSURANCE: 
LATE RENT PAY'T FEE: 
RENT SECURITY DEPOSOT: 
\JT l-OH 
LEASE ABSTRACT 
HOPPING CENTER/CORP. NAME (JS A,/A/ ?t> 
NAME OF LESSEE /-/c«rf/W fa^r C°> 
TRADING AS f 
ADDRESS 
(otb W, 2&6 6 f6o4h 
Wd<g/*<fforr (7-/-, 
SQ. FT Hoop 
LEASE COMMENCEMENT tillhl~\ll6G (r^+SMs b/tMl) 
LEASE TERMS: Jytt. /2*»ft 
RENEWAL / yr. 4//-0 3 . ^/  
RENT INITIAL TERM: /?&?-X? A) a. r3667 Q - l?^,H (*Mh/ C(tl±f»r \«fat*t*ty 
RENT ESCALATION INITIAL TERM: 
RENT DURING RENEWAL TERMS: 3oO*~ J/n* 
PERCENTAGE RENT: 
CAM INITIAL TERM;_ 
CAM RENEWAL TERMS: 
'ZO-Uo. (f>r<f>. Shift) 
TAX INITIAL TERM: 137?J Am*. A ^ , jA. /r ) 
TAX DURING RENEWAL TERMS'^ 
UTILITIES: 
INSURANCE: fltflino. VoU sharr) 
LATE RENT PAY'T FEE: • /<? J*yS, 5"% Cfo~ cA*rjaf*r bad chcfc) 
RENT SECURITY DEPOSOT: 2U7. 4 7 A/) 
EXHIBIT 13 
U.S. REALTY 86 ASSOCIATES 
c/o 
GARDEN COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES 
820 Morris Turnpike, Suite 102 
Short Hills, New Jersey 07078 
Phone: (973) 467-5000, Extension 200 
Facsimile: (973) 467-3480 
April 17,1998 
VTA CERTIFIED MAIL R.R.R. 
Mr. William Olson 
2301 South Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Re: U.S. Realty 86 Associates - Exercise of Ground Lease Option 
Premises: Woods Cross, Utah 
Dear Mr. Olson: 
This letter shall confirm that U.S. Realty 86 Associates is exercising the option to extend the 
term of the subject Ground Lease for an additional five (5) years. The new term shall run from 
August 1, 1998 through July 31, 2003. U.S. Realty 86 Associates will commence paying the 
new yearly ground rent of 512,600.00 on August 1, 1998. U.S. Realty 86 Associates will, of 
course, continue to remit the appropriate portion of any percentage rents received from Kmart 
and any other subtenants located on the subject property. 
Thank you for your attention in this matter. 
Very truly yours, 
U.S. REALTY 86 ASSOCIATES 
MARK A. HOFFMAN 
MAH/dla 
cc: Mark Wilf 
U your RETURN ADDRESS completed on the reveree elde? 
Thank you for using Return Receipt Service 
Z MSN 0 0 1 b^a 
US Postal Service 
Receipt for Certified Mail 
No Insurance Coverage Provided. 
Do not use for International Mail (See reverse) 
f&* William Olson 
Street & Number 
2301 South Main Street 
Post Ofica, Stala, t ZIP Coda 
BnnnHfnl, flf.ah 84010. 
Postage 
Certified Fee 







Return Receipt Shoving to 
Whom i Date Delvered 
flcUn Receipt Showing to Ntaftj 
Oato, I kkktstft Address 
TOTAL Postage* Fees 
PostmiffcorOaJe 
4/17/98 
U.S. REALTY 86 ASSOCIATES 
c/o 
GARDEN COMMERCTAL PROPERTIES 
820 Morris Turnpike, Suite 102 
Short Hills, New Jersey 07078 
Phone: (973) 467-5000, Extension 200 
Facsimile: (973) 467-3480 
April 17, 1998 
VIA CERTIFIED MAIL R.R.H 
Mr. Walt Johnson 
Security Investment Company 
c/o Keith Stahle 
84 South Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Re: U.S. Realty 86 Associates - Exercise of Ground Lease Option 
Premises: Woods Cross, Utah 
Dear Mr. Johnson: 
This letter shall confirm that U.S. Realty 86 Associates is exercising the option to extend the 
term of the subject Ground Lease for an additional five (5) years. The new term shall run from 
August I, 1998 through July 31, 2003- U.S. Realty 86 Associates will commence paying the 
new yearly ground rent of 520,400.00 on August 1, 1998. U.S. Realty S6 Associates will, of 
course, continue to remit the appropriate portion of any percentage rents received from Kmart 
and any other subtenants located on the subject property. 
Thank you for your attention in this matter. 
Very truly yours, 
U.S. REALTY 86 ASSOCIATES 
MARK A. HOFFMAN 
MAH/dla 
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• Comptot* Kama 1 anoVor 2 for additional aarvioaa. 
•Gompleur itama 3,4a, and 45. 
•Prfni your name and addrasa on the ravarta of thia form ao that wa can rwtum thia 
card to you. 
• Attach tNa form to 9m front of tna matfpiaca, or on tha bade if apaca doaa not 
• WHte *Haiium Rtcmpt Aaoua*T#o~ on tha maipiaca batow lha a/tfda numbac 
•Tha Ratum Racaipt wil mow to whom tha artide waj dafvarad and tha date 
daftvamd. 
I also wish to receive the 
following services (for an 
extra fee): 
1. D Addressee's Address 
Z O Restricted Delivery 
Consult postmaster for fee. 
3. Artde Addressed to: 
Mr .\ Walt Johnson 
Security Investment Conpany 
c/o Keith Stahle 
84 South Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
4a. Artide Number 
Z 454 001 691 
4b. Service Type 
a Registered X2XCertifled 
D Express Mai D Insured 
DrktumRe9aiptforMe^handse J COD 
7. Date Zte. 
5. Received By: (Print Nam*) 8. Addressee's Address (Oi 
and fe* la paid) 
6. Signatu^a: (Addrassaa orAgentLS 
Into if/ 
PS Form 3 8 1 1 , December 1994 io2S9$-97.€wi79 Domestic Return Receipt 
EXHIBIT 15 
SECURITY INVESTMENT LTD 
84 South Main 
B o u n t i f u l , Utah 84010 
Phone: (801) 295-3351 
July 8 , 1998 
U.S. REALTY 86 ASSOCIATES 
820 Morris Turnpike Suite 201 
Short Hills, New Jersey 
07078 
ATTENTION; Mark Hoffman 
Dear Mr* Hoffman: 
Please find enclosed the bill for sewer service to the K-Mart 
property in Woods Cross, Utah, covering the period from 1-1-98 to 
12-31-98. Payment should be remitted directly to the South Davis 
County Sewer Improvement District as has been done in the past* 
We belive the road work which was being done on the property is 
now about complete, and are pleased with the results as we hope 
you are. It looks as though we can soon conclude the matter and 
have asked our Attorney to contact you to see what needs to be 
done. Best regards. 
Very truly yours, 
Nora A. Stahle, Partner 
EXHIBIT 18 
S i b l M UJjfcKJJN'b 
2301 SOUTH MAIN / BOUNTIFUL, UTAH 84010 
PHONE (801) 295-3421 
July 15, 1998 
US Realty 86 Association 
c/o Garden Commercial Properties 
820 Morris Turnpike, Suite 102 
Short Hills, New Jersey 07078 
Attn: Mark A. Hoffman 
Dear: Mr. Hoffman, 
Today I was advised by Attorney George Fadel that you had called him concerning a short 
amendment to the lease of August 17, 1972. 
In reviewing the ground lease with Mr. Fadel, it appears from paragraph 22 V , of the ground 
leasethat all of the options granted shall be exercised by notice in writing to the landlord, given 
no later than 150 days prior to the expiration of the then existing lease term and in the manner 
here and after provided. The existing term expires on July 31, 1998. Notice in writing should 
have been given no later than March 3, 1998. Your letter to me is dated April 17, 1998. Only 106 
days notice had been given. 
In as much as there would have to be an amendment, if I were to wave the 150 days notice I 
believe it only fair and reasonable that we adjust the rental to conform more closely to present 
market value. I would emphasize that I would intend to be reasonable. 
Since the time is short I would welcome immediate negotiations for the terms of renewal on the 
lease. However I would like you to understand, that at this time, no further options for renewal 
exist under the ground lease of August 17, 1972. 
Sincerely, 
William K. Olson 
Slim Olsons 
EXHIBIT 19 
SECURITY INVESTMENT LTD. 
84 South Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
July 17, 1998 
U.S. REALTY 86 ASSOCIATES 
%GARDEN COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES 
820 Morris Turnpike, Suite 102 
Short Hills, New" Jersey 07078 
ATTENTION: MR. MARK A. HOFFMAN 
Re: Ground Lease premises, Woods Cross, Utah. 
Dear Mr. Hoffman: 
The ground lease dated August 17, 1972, wherein Security 
Investment Company is named as Landlord and C & W MANHATTAN 
ASSOCIATES is name as Tenant , provides that options for extension 
of the term of the lease be exercised by notice in writing to the 
Landlord given not later than one hundred fifty (150) days prior 
to the expiration of the then-existing lease term. Security 
Investment LTD. is now the Landlord having succeeded to the interest 
of Security Investment Company. 
Security Investment Ltd. now advises you that the option 
not having been properly exercised, the lease terminates on August 
1, 1998. All opti as are accordingly terminated. 
Rental on a month-to-month basis will be $24,000.00 
per month commencing August 1, 1998, and either party may cancel 
by notice served upon the other fifteen days before the end of 
any month. Payment of $24,000.00 on August 1, 1998, and the 
acceptance thereof by Security Investment Ltd. will in no way 
be a waiver of the strict terms of the option contained in the 
ground lease. 
We assume that you will timely advise any subtenants 
of the termination and the contents of this letter. 
Very truly yours, 
Security Investment Ltd. 
